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SECTION 363 SALES: MOOTING DUE PROCESS? 
ABSTRACT 
The use of § 363 sales has become immensely popular. The mechanism is 
no longer used just to get cash funding through the reorganization, but to 
dispose of the bankruptcy petition altogether. The primary benefit of § 363 
sales is their speed. The Lehman Brothers, Chrysler, and General Motors 
bankruptcies demonstrated exigent situations in which courts approved quick 
§ 363 sales to avoid the risk of allowing such large companies to fail. The 
speed of § 363 sales provides an efficient mechanism to obtain cash without 
confirming a reorganization plan, but this speed also leaves creditors 
vulnerable to due process violations because of the condensed time frame. 
Once a court authorizes a § 363 sale, respect for the finality of good faith 
purchases makes creditors’ opportunity for appellate review very limited. 
Final sale orders are immune from modification or reversal by the mootness 
provision in § 363(m). The shroud of mootness can compel debtors to create 
an emergency situation, forcing courts to choose between approving abridged 
procedural protections and compromising a successful reorganization. This 
Comment will demonstrate how Chrysler and GM serve as examples for how 
debtors and powerful asset purchasers can use § 363 to expedite and moot 
creditor due process. This Comment suggests that protecting due process is an 
equally important pillar of bankruptcy law as finality and makes 
recommendations to mitigate creditors’ lack of remedies in § 363 sales without 
sacrificing the principle of finality. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Over the past two decades, § 363 sales have become an increasingly 
common and controversial method to reorganize financially distressed 
companies. Section 363 offers a distressed company an efficient mechanism to 
obtain cash for its reorganization. By condensing the bankruptcy process, 
§ 363 sales make creditors’ due process rights especially vulnerable. 
Nonetheless, once a court authorizes a sale, a creditor has very little 
opportunity to appeal. 
Section 363 sales allow a trustee or debtor-in-possession (“DIP”) to use, 
sell, or lease all or substantially all of the property of the estate, outside the 
ordinary course of business, provided there is notice and hearing of the sale.1 
Since the addition of § 363 to the Bankruptcy Code (the “Code”),2 § 363 sales 
are increasingly used not only to obtain cash to fund the reorganization 
process, but to sell entire companies and dispose of the bankruptcy without a 
plan. The surge of § 363 sales corresponds with debtors increasingly using 
chapter 11 as a means to sell a business.3 More than twenty percent of chapter 
11 cases are disposed of through § 363 sales.4 
Finality is a vital pillar of bankruptcy: it creates certainty that parties can 
continue in reorganization without being mired in endless litigation. In § 363 
sales, finality encapsulates that reverence for bona fide purchasers.5 Ensuring 
finality encourages participation in reorganizations and increases the amount 
bidders are willing to pay for debtors’ assets.6 Congress emphasized finality by 
incorporating § 363(m), which moots appeals of authorized § 363 sales.7 Thus, 
 
 1 11 U.S.C. § 363(b) (2006). While the statute refers to the “trustee,” the debtor in possession may 
exercise all the rights afforded to the trustee. Id. §1107. 
 2 See H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 181–82 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6301–03 
(discussing the legislative intent of the section). 
 3 Douglas G. Baird, The New Face of Chapter 11, 12 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 69, 80–81 (2004) 
(stating three-quarters of bankruptcies are used to sell the company). As of 2002, of the ten largest 
bankruptcies, eight used the bankruptcy court to sell their assets to the highest bidder. Id; see also Appendix A, 
Chart I. 
 4 This is true for 2003–2009; 2010 data does not yet bear this out. 363 Sales of All or Substantially All 
Assets in Large, Public Company Bankruptcies, as a Percentage of All Cases Disposed, by Year of Case 
Disposition, AM. BANKR. INST. (last visited on Oct. 5, 2012), http://lopucki.law.ucla.edu/tables_and_graphs/ 
363_sale_percentage_graph_4-6-2011.pdf. 
 5 The terms “bona fide purchaser” and “good faith purchaser” are synonymous. A good faith purchaser’s 
purchase for value has a superior right to purchased property to transferor’s creditors, even if the transferor 
defrauds the creditor. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1355 (9th ed. 2009). 
 6 In re Sax, 796 F.2d 994, 997 (7th Cir. 1986). 
 7 11 U.S.C. § 363(m) (2006); see also infra Part I.B. 
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if undiscovered oversights or mistakes occur prior to the sale’s authorization, 
creditors have extremely limited options for appellate review.8 
The right of aggrieved parties to have adverse decisions reviewed competes 
with a strong policy of finality.9 Courts face the challenge of juggling 
competing claims to fashion the optimal relief to all creditors. Standards for 
sale approval give great weight to the debtor’s and buyer’s insistence that the 
sale be done urgently. Though this urgency may be authentic, it poses the 
danger of tipping the scales too heavily in favor of a debtor in a conflict with a 
creditor. Because creditors have limited recourse for grievances post-
authorization, courts must strive to balance the scales prior to sale 
confirmation. 
This Comment addresses the competing polices that materialize in § 363 
proceedings: due process for all parties affected by a sale and protecting the 
viability of sales through finality. Part I discusses the efficiency of § 363 sales, 
while demonstrating the negative ramifications of the diminished protections 
for creditors. Part II examines the concerns that can arise with quick sales 
through discussion of the Chrysler and General Motors bankruptcies and their 
progeny. Because expedited proceedings are vulnerable to error, some courts 
have interpreted § 363(m) to allow relief when such relief would not sacrifice 
finality. Capitalizing on such a balance, Part III suggests an equitable approach 
to due process, which weighs the interests of a successful reorganization and of 
the creditors to ensure both parties are protected before a sale is authorized, to 
avoid undermining the finality of sales. 
I. SECTION 363 SALES 
Section 363 sales offer great advantages but have less protection for 
creditors than the plan process. The procedure relies heavily on the debtor’s 
judgment to assess the exigency of the situation, and puts creditors at a 
disadvantage because they must act quickly, despite an informational 
disadvantage, to successfully object to a motion for sale. Once a court 
authorizes the sale, creditors have very limited opportunity for redress because 
mootness operates to protect good faith buyers and foreclose appeals. Though 
 
 8 See infra Part I.B. 
 9 Ira L. Herman, Finality Through Mootness: Protecting Capital Providers in Bankruptcy Cases., ASSET 
SALES COMM. NEWSLETTER, Apr. 2007, at 7, available at www.abiworld.org/committees/newsletters/ 
assetsales/vol4num2/AssetSales.pdf (citing Mission Iowa Wind Co. v. Enron Corp. (In re Enron Corp.), 291 
B.R. 39 (S.D.N.Y. 2003)). 
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a party might seek a stay pending appeal, the court that approved an exigent 
sale is unlikely to grant the extraordinary remedy. 
A. Section 363 Sale Advantages & Disadvantages 
1. Advantages: Section 363 Provides an Efficient Transfer of Assets 
Mechanism 
Section 363 sales provide debtors a valuable and flexible tool. The option 
provides debtors the ability to quickly dispose of a rapidly depreciating asset, 
liquidate the estate expediently, and complete the sale without a lengthy 
chapter 11 reorganization plan.10 The sales promote more efficient markets 
than liquidation.11 The sales provide benefits to debtors by allowing sales free 
and clear of liens under § 363(f),12 allow protections from successor liability, 
and have lower administrative costs than chapter 11.13 Section 363 may allow 
actions that would normally not get confirmation as a chapter 11 plan or get 
shareholders’ approval outside of bankruptcy.14 One of the most significant 
 
 10 3 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 363.02 (Alan N. Resnick & Henry J. Sommer eds.,16th ed. 2011). 
 11 See In re Gulf Coast Oil Corp., 404 B.R. at 407, 424 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2009) (“The principal 
justification for § 363(b) sales is that aggressive marketing in an active market assures that the estate will 
receive maximum benefit.”); Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, The End of Bankruptcy, 55 STAN. L. 
REV. 751 (2002); Jason Berge, An Efficiency Model of Section 363(b) Sales, 92 VA. L. REV. 1639 (2006). 
Contra Lynn M. LoPucki & Joseph W. Doherty, Bankruptcy Fire Sales, 106 MICH. L. REV. 1, 24 (2007) 
(providing empirical evidence that judicially-based valuations are more accurate (based on post-reorganization 
trading values) than valuations in bidding). 
 12 11 U.S.C. § 363(f). The section allows such sales provided one of the following: (1) applicable 
nonbankruptcy law permits; (2) the entity consents; (3) the price of the property to be sold is greater than the 
aggregate value of all the liens on the property; (4) a bona fide dispute; or (5) the entity could be compelled in 
a legal or equitable proceeding to accept money satisfaction. Id. This Comment focuses on § 363(b), and will 
not discuss the breadth of a purchaser’s ability to acquire assets without any accompanying liabilities. See, e.g., 
Clear Channel Outdoor, Inc. v. Knupfer (In re PW, LLC), 391 B.R. 25, 37–47 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2008) 
(discussing statutory interpretation of § 363(f); see also Lee R. Bogdanoff, The Purchase and Sale of Assets in 
Reorganization Cases-of Interest and Principal, of Principles and Interests, 47 BUS. LAW. 1367, 1399–1425 
(1992). 
 13 Joseph J. Wielebinski, et al., Recurrent and Developing Issues Encountered in Sales Pursuant to 
Section 363 of the Bankruptcy Code, ADVANCED BUSINESS BANKRUPTCY CONFERENCE, MAY 1–2, 2008, 
AUSTIN, TEXAS, CHAPTER 2, at 1, available at www.munsch.com/files/1610223_1.pdf. The 2005 amendments 
added more procedural hurdles to chapter 11 plans, making § 363 sales more attractive. See Daniel P. Winikka, 
The Declining Use of Chapter 11 as a Reorganization Tool, in BANKRUPTCY AND RESTRUCTURING CHAPTER 
11 STRATEGIES 2009: TOP LAWYERS ON TRENDS AND KEY STRATEGIES FOR THE UPCOMING YEAR, 1 (Aspatore 
Thought Leadership ed., 2009). 
 14 Miami Ctr. Ltd. P’ship. v. Bank of N.Y., 838 F. 2d 1547, 1553 (11th Cir. 1998). But see Craig A. 
Sloane, The Sub Rosa Plan of Reorganization: Side-Stepping Creditor Protections in Chapter 11, 16 BANKR. 
DEV. J. 37, 62 (1999) (arguing a debtor should not be able to consummate a transaction which would not be 
approved under the plan provisions of chapter 11). 
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advantages of the sales is § 363(m), which statutorily moots appeals of § 363 
sales.15 
A quick resolution in bankruptcy offers advantages not only to the debtor, 
but also to the creditors and the national economy. Free of inefficiently 
deployed assets, a debtor can devote its newly obtained cash and energies to its 
future operations.16 The sales avoid the potentially less efficient results that 
would be achieved through the bargaining and litigation of plan confirmation.17 
The buyer, who values the debtor’s assets, will deploy them at a lower cost and 
with greater economic output.18 Creditors forego the administrative costs of 
confirming a plan and, assuming a market auction for the assets sold, a fair 
return on their claims.19 The national economy benefits from the continued 
existence of the debtor as an employer and output producer, more efficient 
deployment of resources, and less burden on bankruptcy courts.20 
The Lehman Brothers bankruptcy demonstrated the necessity for the 
flexible, quick solution of § 363 sales. In 2008, facing the height of a financial 
crisis, Lehman had no more cash: after borrowing heavily from risky short-
term financing, there were no more lenders, Lehman could not find a buyer, 
and the U.S. government denied the company federal bailout funds.21 Lehman 
had no choice but to file chapter 11.22 Barclay’s immediately stepped in as a 
willing buyer.23 Lehman’s Chief Operating Officer testified that if the sale 
were not approved immediately, the company would likely disappear as a 
 
 15 Infra Part II.B. 
 16 Robert G. Hansen & Randall S. Thomas, Auctions in Bankruptcy: Theoretical Analysis and Practical 
Guidance, 18 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 159, 164 (1998). 
 17 Lucian Arye Bebchuk, A New Approach to Corporate Reorganizations, 101 HARV. L. REV. 775, 777–
81 (1988); see also Harvey R. Miller, Chapter 11 Reorganization Cases and the Delaware Myth, 55 VAND. L. 
REV. 1987 (2002) (arguing that creditors have more leverage in plan confirmation negotiations). 
 18 Robert G. Hansen & Randall S. Thomas, Auctions in Bankruptcy: Theoretical Analysis and Practical 
Guidance, 18 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 159, 164 (1998) (arguing that ownership shifts from the bankrupt, or 
inefficient, firms, to more efficient users of those goods). 
 19 See Baird & Rasmussen, supra note 11, at 786–87 (discussing the efficiency of going-concern sales in 
auctions). 
 20 Bebchuk, supra note 17, at 777–81. 
 21 Bay Harbour Mgmt., Ltd. Corp. v. Lehman Bros. Holdings Inc. (In re Lehman Bros. Holdings Inc.), 
415 B.R. 77, 79 (S.D.N.Y. 2009). 
 22 Id. at 80–81. The court’s approval pivoted on avoiding potential losses in the hundreds of billions of 
dollars. Barclay’s Mem. in Opposition to the Rule 60 Motions and in Supp. to Enforce the Sale Order and 
Secure Delivery of Undelivered Assets, Bay Harbour Mgmt., Ltd. Corp. v. Lehman Bros. Holdings, Inc. (In re 
Lehman Bros. Holding, Inc.), 415 B.R. 77 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (Nos. 08-13555 (JMP), 08-01420 (JMP)), 2010 
WL 390937 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Jan. 29, 2010). 
 23 Lehman Bros., 415 B.R. at 80. 
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going concern.24 Before approving the expedited procedure, the court 
addressed the due process issues, noting that heavy media coverage of 
Lehman’s bankruptcy proceedings served as ample notice to creditors to act to 
protect their rights.25 The case represented the archetypical “melting ice cube” 
situation for which § 363(b) was intended: when the value of the debtor’s 
assets is certain to decrease in the future.26 The size of the assets for sale was 
so large that there would unlikely be another interested buyer.27 Without cash, 
the company could not continue operations; the only alternative to the sale was 
immediate liquidation, which would elicit fewer funds for the estate and 
decrease overall economic output.28 
2. Disadvantages: Section 363 Provide Creditors Less Protection than a 
Plan 
The economic benefits of debtors quickly reorganizing are counteracted by 
the potential harms of creditors unwilling to lend because of the threat that 
speedy bankruptcies will bypass their rights. Weary of a bankruptcy system 
that sacrifices creditors’ rights at the first sign of the debtor’s imminent failure, 
creditors will stop lending to companies that exhibit any risk of bankruptcy.29 
 
 24 Id. 
 25 Id. 
 26 See Fred N. David, Interpreting the Supreme Court’s Treatment of the Chrysler Bankruptcy and Its 
Impact on Future Business Reorganizations, 27 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 25, 36 (2010) (discussing Ind. State 
Police Pension Trust v. Chrysler LLC (In re Chrysler LLC), 576 F.3d 108, 111 (2d Cir. 2009), aff’d, 556 U.S. 
960, 960 (2009), vacated, 130 S. Ct. 1015 (2009), remanded, 592 F.3d 370 (2d Cir. 2010)). 
 27 In re Lehman Bros. Holdings, Inc., 445 B.R. 143, 180 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2011), aff’d in part, rev’d in 
part, sub nom. Barclays Capital, Inc. v. Giddens (In re Lehman Bros., Inc.), Nos. 11 Civ. 6052(KBF), 11 Civ. 
6053(KBF), 2012 WL 2918675, at *23 (S.D.N.Y. July 16, 2012) (reversed as to the assets to which Barclay’s 
was entitled). 
 28 Id. But see Joseph N. Argentina Jr. & Andrew C. Kassner, The Fog of War, Bankruptcy Sales: Urgent 
Circumstances Help Preserve Bankruptcy Sales Despite Deficiencies, 243 THE LEGAL INTELLIGENCER 83 
(Apr. 29, 2011) (expressing doubt that the sale would have been approved but for the poor economic 
conditions). 
 29 Barry E. Adler, A Reassessment of Bankruptcy Reorganization After Chrysler and General Motors, 18 
AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 305, 315–16 & n.13 (2010) (suggesting that accepting these cases as precedential 
could increase the cost of capital, but acknowledging that empirical evidence to support this theory does not 
exist); Mark J. Roe & David Skeel, Assessing the Chrysler Bankruptcy, 108 MICH. L. REV. 727, 771 (2010) 
(“These are neither small nor simply fairness-based considerations: capital markets depend on effective 
mechanisms that prevent financial majorities from ousting financial minorities from their ratable position in an 
enterprise. That’s what’s at stake.”); see also Brief for Washington Legal Foundation et al. as Amici Curiae 
Supporting Petitioner, Ind. State Police Pension Trust v. Chrysler LLC, 130 S. Ct. 1015 (2009) (No. 09-285), 
2009 WL 3263076, at *7 (“Absent clearly defined limits on the use of Section 363 sales to strip creditors of 
their security interests, the credit markets will dry up amidst investor uncertainty.”). 
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Criticisms of § 363 include the vast power afforded to large creditors 
and/or existing management,30 the potential for “sweetheart deals,”31 less 
required disclosure than reorganization plans,32 and the circumvention of the 
creditor committees and their interests.33 Although reorganizations often entail 
lengthy confirmation processes, the procedures to approve chapter 11 plans 
protect creditors’ rights and ensure the sanctity of bankruptcy proceedings.34 
Although a debtor may sell substantially all of its assets through a 
reorganization plan under § 1123(b)(4),35 most practitioners prefer § 363 sales 
because of the reduced time and cost.36 In a § 363 sale, a buyer holds more 
leverage than the debtor, since reorganization depends on consummation of the 
sale.37 
Since urgent sales often necessitate abbreviated notice, creditors have less 
time to process less information. For a plan, disclosure statements lengthen the 
process of confirming a plan but give creditors thorough information,38 
pursuant to the Code’s mandate of “adequate information.”39 Disclosures for a 
§ 363 sale need only contain a description of the property40 and nothing more, 
not even the reason for the urgent sale.41 
 
 30 LYNN M. LOPUCKI, COURTING FAILURE: HOW COMPETITION FOR BIG BANKRUPTCY CASES IS 
CORRUPTING THE BANKRUPTCY COURTS 167–80 (2005). 
 31 See Elizabeth B. Rose, Comment, Chocolate, Flowers, and § 363(b):The Opportunity for Sweetheart 
Deals Without Chapter 11 Protections, 23 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 249, 275–83 (2006). 
 32 See id. at 277–80. 
 33 George W. Kuney, Hijacking Chapter 11, 21 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 19, 106 (2004). But see Baird & 
Rasmussen, supra note 11 (arguing that reorganizations will be displaced by 363 sales because of their 
efficiency). 
 34 In re Bombay Co., No. 07-44084-RFN-11, 2007 WL 2826071, at *3 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. Sept. 26, 2007) 
(noting its preference for chapter 11, but if it is not used, creditors should at least be afforded the luxury of 
sufficient time to assess fully the proposed transaction). 
 35 11 U.S.C. § 1123(b)(4) (2006). This provision allows liquidation through chapter 11. 7 COLLIER, supra 
note 10, ¶ 1123.02[4]. 
 36 Robert M. Fishman & Gordon E. Gouveia, What’s Driving Section 363 Sales After Chrysler and 
General Motors, 19 J. BANKR. L. & PRAC. 4 Art. 2 (2010), available at Westlaw, 19 J. Bankr. L. & Prac. 4 Art. 
2. 
 37 See Daniel J. Bussel & Kenneth N. Klee, Recalibrating Consent in Bankruptcy, 83 AM. BANKR. L.J. 
663, 731 (2009); cf. Miller, supra note 17 (arguing that chapter 11 is no longer an even playing field between 
debtors and creditors). 
 38 See Elizabeth B. Rose, supra note 31, at 282–83 (2006) (discussing the difference in disclosure 
requirements between 363 and chapter 11 reorganization plans). 
 39 11 U.S.C. § 1125; see also George W. Kuney, Let’s Make It Official: Adding an Explicit Preplan Sale 
Process as an Alternative Exit from Bankruptcy, 40 HOUS. L. REV. 1265, 1290–93 (2004). However, most 
courts have local rules on what should be included in the motions and notice. Douglas E. Deutsch & Adam G. 
Landis, An Introduction to Local Bankruptcy Rules, AM. BANKR. INST. J., June 2009, at 55, 72. 
 40 FED. R. BANKR. P. 2002(c)(1). 
 41 COLLIER, supra note 10, ¶ 363.02[1]. 
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Section 363 sales should only provide for the transfer of assets and not 
dictate the terms of reorganization that would be determined by a 
reorganization plan.42 Courts call a plan disguised as a sale a “sub rosa plan.”43 
Allowing a sale to stipulate the terms of reorganization would “short circuit the 
plan,” without giving creditors the same opportunity as in a plan to protect 
their rights.44 For instance, all plan confirmations require that the plan treat 
creditors “fair[ly] and equitabl[y]” and not unfairly discriminate against 
them.45 The plan confirmation process offers creditors more time to air 
grievances and negotiate with the DIP. The imbalance of power of a creditor 
acting as a purchaser compounds the sale’s resemblance to a plan because a 
buyer-creditor gets extensive leverage in setting the terms of the sale as well as 
stalking horse bidder protections.46 Stalking horse bidders get benefits for 
attracting other bidders and setting a bid floor, but these benefits should not be 
so great as to deter prospective buyers.47 Bidding procedures that provide the 
buyer (a creditor) significant benefits at the expense of other creditors would 
violate protections afforded in plan confirmation.48 
3. Sales Procedures 
Courts generally take a supervisory role in § 363 sale procedures—
deferring to market principles and the debtor’s business judgment. Federal 
Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure (the “Rules” or “Rule”) 6004 dictates the 
procedure for § 363 sales.49 Often, the sale authorization process has two 
stages: the court approves the sale and the bidding procedures, and once the 
 
 42 Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. Brainiff Airways, Inc. (In re Brainiff Airways, Inc.), 700 F.2d 935, 940 
(5th Cir. 1983). 
 43 Id. 
 44 See In re Gen. Motors Corp., 407 B.R. 463, 495 (citing Brainiff Airways, 700 F.2d at 940). But see 
Ralph Brubaker & Charles Jordan Tabb, Bankruptcy Reorganizations and the Troubling Legacy of Chrysler 
and GM, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 1375 (arguing Chrysler and GM effectively stripped the sub rosa doctrine of 
any meaning). 
 45 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(1) (2006).  
 46 Harvey R. Miller & Shai Y. Waisman, Is Chapter 11 Bankrupt?, 47 B.C. L. REV. 129, 154 (2005) 
(explaining that DIP financing is increasingly common because debtors have large amounts of secured debt). 
Because of this, pre-bankruptcy secured creditors have greater leverage to impose severe covenants and 
conditions on the debtors and its activities. Id. 
 47 See Robert J. Keach, Stalking-Horse Lenders and Good Faith: The Availability of Appellate Protection 
Under §§ 363(m) and 364(e) for Asset Purchasers Extending DIP Financing, AM. BANKR. INST. J., June 2004, 
at 28, 58. 
 48 See Roe & Skeel, supra note 29, at 755. 
 49 10 COLLIER, supra note 10, ¶ 6004.01. 
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auction is complete, the court approves the purchaser.50 Sometimes, the court 
approves a single buyer and there is no auction.51 When there is an auction, 
many judges believe they should have limited or no involvement because they 
believe an auction results in a more accurate valuation without a judge’s 
intervention.52 A debtor often negotiates bidding and sale procedures with a 
stalking horse bidder.53 The initial stalking horse bid is always subject to better 
offers.54 Courts defer to the business judgment of the debtor’s management 
when approving bidding procedures and the best offer.55 The best offer need 
not be the highest, but the DIP must have a compelling reason for why a lower 
offer is superior to the highest.56 When there is only one bidder, judges have 
little option but to conclude that the proposed sale is the highest and best.57 
When approving a lone bidder or the bidding procedures for an auction, the 
court must also approve the manner by which creditors will be notified of the 
sale.58 Section 102(1)(A) provides that notice is required as “appropriate in the 
particular circumstances.”59 Rule 6004, which governs the § 363 sale 
procedure, incorporates the notice procedures of Rule 2002.60 Rule 2002 
 
 50 Jonathan Friedland & James H.M. Sprayregen, The Legal Considerations of Acquiring Distressed 
Businesses: A Primer, 11 J. BANKR. L. & PRAC. 3 Art. 8 (2001), available at Westlaw 11 J. Bankr. L. & Prac. 3 
Art. 8. 
 51 Id. at 13. 
 52 Id. at 9–10; see also H.R. REP. NO. 95–595, at 227 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 
6186–87 (explaining that judicial valuations are a disfavored process). 
 53 A stalking horse bidder is the bidder who the debtor chooses to make the first bid. The most common 
protection is a break-up fee. Michael Sirota & Felice Yudkin, Litigation Concerning the Use, Sale, or Lease of 
Estate Property Other than Cash Collateral, in COMM. BANKR. LITIG. § 7:5 (Jonathan P. Friedland ed., 2011). 
 54 Frank B. Reilly, Jr. & David N. Crapo, Distressed M&A: Bankruptcy Code Section 363 Sales, PRATT’S 
J. BANKR. L., Apr. 2009, available at Westlaw, JBKRL 2009.04-1. 
 55 See H.R. REP. NO. 95–595, at 227, 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6186–87 (explaining that judicial valuations 
are a disfavored process); see also, e.g., In re Borders Grp., Inc., 453 B.R. 477, 482–83 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 
2011); In re Bombay Co., No. 07-44084-RFN-11, 2007 WL 2826071, at *4 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. Sept. 26, 2007); 
In re 995 Fifth Ave. Assocs., L.P., 96 B.R. 24, 28 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1989). 
 56 Borders Grp., 453 B.R. at 482–83 (citing In re Gulf States Steel, Inc., 285 B.R. 497, 516 (Bankr. N.D. 
Ala. 2002)) (holding that courts defer to a debtor’s business judgment when selecting the highest and best 
bids); see also In re Dewey Ranch Hockey, L.L.C., 406 B.R. 30, 40 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 2009) (holding the debtor 
could purchase one bidder over another because of its interest in maintaining the team’s location). 
 57 COMM. ON BANKR. AND CORPORATE REORGANIZATION, N.Y.C. BAR, CORPORATE BANKRUPTCIES: 
TRENDS IN ASSET SALES AND LIQUIDATIONS (2010), available at http://www.nycbar.org/pdf/report/uploads/ 
20071875-CorporateBankruptciesTrendsinAssetSalesandLiquidations.pdf; see also In re Virteous Steel Prods. 
Co., 911 F.2d 1223, 1232–33 (7th Cir. 1990) (holding the bankruptcy court’s balancing between the need to 
wait for the “best offer” and need to stop future losses was not unreasonable). 
 58 COLLIER, supra note 10, ¶ 363.02[1]. 
 59 11 U.S.C. § 102(1)(A) (2006). 
 60 10 COLLIER, supra note 10, ¶ 6004.01. 
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requires twenty-one days’ notice, unless shortened for cause shown.61 No court 
can grant any relief within twenty-one days of the filing of a petition, unless 
necessary “to avoid immediate and irreparable harm.”62 
Section 102 authorizes action without a hearing if no party-in-interest 
timely requests one.63 Courts usually infer from a lack of objections that a sale 
may proceed without a hearing.64 The short time between a proposed sale and 
authorization can leave a creditor little time to formulate a meaningful 
objection to counter the debtor’s extensively prepared argument for the sale’s 
dire need.65 Disorganized creditors’ committees or smaller creditors with less 
sophisticated counsel suffer from disadvantages in formulating objections: they 
have less information, less time, and possibly a geographic barrier.66 A party 
may object to a sale order, but must do so at least seven days before the court 
hears a motion for sale.67 Objections might allege that the purchase price is 
suboptimal, that the purchase price does not provide adequate protection under 
§ 363(e),68 collusion under § 363(n), 69 or that the sale constitutes a sub rosa 
plan.70 
 
 61 FED. R. BANKR. P. 2002(a)(2). Judges have discretion to shorten notice requirements per Rule 
9006(c)(1). Id. 9006(c)(1). See infra Part II.D.4.a. 
 62 FED. R. BANKR. P. 6003. Subsection (b) enumerates § 363 sales as being governed by the rule. Id. 
6003(b). 
 63 11 U.S.C. § 102; see also COLLIER, supra note 10, ¶ 363.02 (citing In re Robert L. Hallamore Corp., 
40 B.R. 181, 182–83 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1984) (explaining that the 1978 Amendments allowed sales without 
court approval under Rule 2002 and 6004)). 
 64 COLLIER, supra note 10, ¶ 363.02 [1][a]. But see In re Bombay Co., No. 07-44084-RFN-11, 2007 WL 
2826071, at *4 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. Sept. 26, 2007) (noting that even though there were some objectors, the 
court was not satisfied that all potential objectors had the opportunity to voice their objections); In re Naron & 
Wagner, Chartered, 88 B.R. 85, 89 (Bankr. D. Md. 1988) (holding a second round of notice statements as 
adequately notifying creditors in lieu of chapter 11 organization disclosure). 
 65 See Christopher W. Frost, Running the Asylum: Governance Problems in Bankruptcy Reorganizations, 
34 ARIZ. L. REV. 89, 128–29 (1992) (explaining that judges only get a one-sided version of the facts when 
parties do not have an opportunity for fact finding); see also infra Part II.C (discussing that in GM the court 
worked through 850 objections in just three days); cf. Rose, supra note 31, at 262.  
 66 Because of the Code’s venue provisions, debtors have wide latitude on where to file. See 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1408. For discussion on the topic of forum shopping generally, see generally Theodore Eisenberg & Lynn 
M. LoPucki, Shopping for Judges: An Empirical Analysis of Venue Choice in Large Chapter 11 
Reorganizations, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 967 (1999); William C. Whitford, Venue Choice: Where the Action Is, 
54 BUFF. L. REV. 321 (2006); Todd J. Zywicki, Is Forum Shopping Corrupting America’s Bankruptcy Courts?, 
94 GEO. L.J. 1141 (2006). 
 67 The court may also fix a different time for objections. FED. R. BANKR. P. 6004(b). While a hearing 
date is not necessary if there are no objections, the notice should set a court date. 10 COLLIER, supra note 10, 
¶ 6004.01. 
 68 11 U.S.C. § 363(e). If an objection alleges inadequate protection, the burden of proof rests on the 
trustee. Id. § 363(p). To determine whether a price is inadequate, a creditor may need to spend a significant 
amount of money for an independent valuation. A fair market sales procedure is usually enough proof of 
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If there are no objections, the sale may also proceed without court 
authorization, but buyers usually request a court order for the sale with an 
explicit finding of good faith.71 The term “good faith” has no definition in the 
Code.72 Most courts require a finding that the party who acquired the property 
was (a) in good faith, as per the traditional definition of not in bad faith, (b) for 
value, and (c) without knowledge of adverse claims.73 Section 363(m) 
explicitly protects good faith buyers; thus, many sale orders state that the 
purchaser meets the good faith standard of § 363(m).74 
Once a court authorizes a sale, Rule 6004(h) provides an automatic 
fourteen-day stay before sale consummation, but the Rule grants the judge 
discretion to shorten or eliminate the stay. 75 In theory, the Rule aimed to avoid 
the race to court between a creditor (seeking to stop the sale) and a seller 
(seeking quick approval and mootness protection).76 In practice, courts almost 
always eliminate the stay in light of the debtor’s push to complete the sale 
quickly.77 As discussed below, a stay pending appeal is an extraordinary 
remedy, and parties are unlikely to succeed on a motion for one.78 
 
adequate protection. LoPucki & Doherty, supra note 11, at 38. The movant also bears the burden to prove “the 
issue of the validity, priority, or extent of such interest.” 11 U.S.C. § 363(p)(2). 
 69 Id. § 363(n). 
 70 See supra text accompanying notes 42–45. 
 71 COLLIER, supra note 10, ¶ 363.02. 
 72 See Made in Detroit, Inc. v. Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of Made in Detroit, Inc. (In re 
Made in Detroit, Inc.), 414 F.3d 576, 581 (6th Cir. 2005) (explaining that the traditional definition is circular 
because it provides that a good faith purchaser is one who purchases assets for value in good faith). Typical 
actions that denote bad faith are fraud, collusion, or an attempt to take grossly unfair advantage of other 
creditors. See id. 
 73 See, e.g., T.C. Investors v. Joseph (In re M Capital Corp.), 290 B.R. 743, 746 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2003); 
Willemain v. Kivitz, 764 F.2d 1019, 1023 (4th Cir. 1985) (quoting In re Rock Indus. Mach. Corp., 572 F.2d 
1195, 1197 (7th Cir. 1978)). 
 74 E.g., General Order M-383, U.S. BANKR. COURT S. DIST. N.Y., http://www.nysb.uscourts.gov/orders/ 
m383.pdf (last visited Nov. 4, 2012); Guidelines Re Sale Orders, U.S. BANKR. COURT N. DIST. CAL., http:// 
www.canb.uscourts.gov/procedures/dist/guidelines/order-re-sale-orders (last visited Nov. 4, 2012); Bob 
Eisenbach, Delaware Bankruptcy Court Adopts New Local Rule for Section 363 Sales, IN THE (RED): THE 
BUSINESS BANKRUPTCY BLOG, http://bankruptcy.cooley.com/2008/02/articles/business-bankruptcy-issues/ 
delaware-bankruptcy-court-adopts-new-local-rule-for-section-363-sales/ (last visited Nov. 4, 2012). 
 75 FED. R. BANKR. P. 6004(h). 
 76 COLLIER, supra note 10, ¶ 363.11. 
 77 Josef S. Athanas, Section 363 Bankruptcy Sales Attacked by Judges and Commentators Just as 
Economic Conditions Make Them More Important Than Ever, in BANKRUPTCY AND RESTRUCTURING 
CHAPTER 11 STRATEGIES 2009: TOP LAWYERS ON TRENDS AND KEY STRATEGIES FOR THE UPCOMING YEAR, 1 
(Aspatore Thought Leadership ed., 2009).. 
 78 Infra Part I.C. 
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B. Mootness 
Section 363(m) sets a seemingly clear standard that no asset can be taken 
back from a good faith purchaser, regardless of other equitable concerns. The 
statute reads: 
The reversal or modification on appeal of an authorization under 
subsection (b) or (c) of this section of a sale or lease of property does 
not affect the validity of a sale or lease under such authorization to an 
entity that purchased or leased such property in good faith, whether 
or not such entity knew of the pendency of the appeal, unless such 
authorization and such sale or lease were stayed pending appeal.79 
The provision furthers the goal of finality by protecting good faith buyers.80 
The reverence for finality predates the Code.81 All courts agree on the 
importance of this interest, but disagree on whether there are exceptions to this 
statutory mootness provision.82 
The plain meaning of § 363(m) protects only good faith buyers from 
appeals challenging the validity of the buyer’s title. Though the statute allows 
an appeal if a stay was obtained, courts disagree on whether this provision bars 
all appeals absent a stay or allows exceptions when an appeal would not 
modify “the validity of the sale.”83 Some courts broadly interpret that 
reopening any part of the sale order on which the buyer relied would disturb 
the validity of the sale.84 However, some courts specify that relief from parties 
other than the good faith buyer is possible if the validity of the sale would not 
 
 79 11 U.S.C. § 363(m) (2006). 
 80 Vlasek v. Levey (In re Vlasek), 325 F.3d 955, 961 (7th Cir. 2003); Cinicola v. Scharffenberger, 248 
F.3d 110, 1121–22 (3d Cir. 2001); Boullioun Aircraft Holding Co. v. Smith Mgmt. (In re W. Pac. Airlines, 
Inc.), 181 F.3d 1191, 1195 (10th Cir. 1999); In re Lehman Bros. Holdings, Inc., 445 B.R. 143, 181 (Bankr. 
S.D.N.Y. 2011) (citing United States v. Salerno, 932 F.2d 117, 123 (2d Cir. 1991)), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 
sub nom. Barclays Capital Inc. v. Giddens (In re Lehman Bros., Inc.), 473 B.R. 34 (S.D.N.Y. 2012); GAF 
Holdings, L.L.C. v. Rinaldi (In re Farmland Indus., Inc.), 408 B.R. 497, 508 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. 2009) (citing 
Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors v. Trism, Inc. (In re Trism, Inc.), 328 F.3d 1003, 1006 (8th Cir. 
2003)), aff’d, 639 F.3d 402 (8th Cir. 2011). 
 81 H.R. REP. DOC. NO. 93-137, pt.1, 100 n.26 (1973) (quoting Ex parte Christy, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 292, 
312 (1845)). 
 82 See infra Part II.C. 
 83 Compare Krebs Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc. v. Valley Motors, Inc., 141 F.3d 490, 499 (3d Cir. 1998), 
with Cincinnati Microwave, Inc. v. Baldiga (In re Whistler Corp. of Mass.), 243 B.R. 573, 575 (D. Mass. 
2000) (rejecting a validity of the sale exception). 
 84 But see In re Cont’l Airlines, 91 F.3d 553, 572 (3d Cir. 1996) (Alito, J., dissenting) (“The mere act of 
entertaining that claim would not imperil Continental’s reorganization or impair any legitimate reliance 
interests.”). 
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be disturbed.85 One bankruptcy appellate panel held that § 363(m) only 
protects sales under subsections (b) and (c).86 Most courts reject this 
interpretation because sales under subsections (b) and (c) rely on the other 
subsections of § 363.87 
Once an appeal is declared moot, the court will never consider the merits of 
an appellant’s motion. Statutory mootness precludes appeals regardless of 
whether there is still a live controversy.88 In any bankruptcy case, relief on 
appeal is especially tricky because of the limited ability for relief.89 When there 
is no equitable relief possible in a bankruptcy matter, courts may declare the 
issue equitably moot.90 Most courts adopt a multi-part test to determine 
whether equitable mootness applies,91 with substantial consummation92 as the 
foremost factor.93 In § 363 sales, consummation is more direct than in a plan: 
once a court authorizes a sale, the only remedy is to take back the assets from 
 
 85 Salerno, 932 F.2d at 123 (holding that while an appeal concerning a sale order was moot, appellant 
was free to object to the distribution of the proceeds). 
 86 Clear Channel Outdoor, Inc. v. Knupfer (In re PW, L.L.C.), 391 B.R. 25, 35–36 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 
2008); see infra Part II.C.3. 
 87 Official Comms. of Unsecured Creditors v. Anderson Senior Living Prop., L.L.C. (In re Nashville 
Senior Living, L.L.C.), 407 B.R. 222, 228 (B.A.P. 6th Cir. 2009) (“Clear Channel appears to be an aberration 
in well-settled bankruptcy jurisprudence applying § 363(m) to the ‘free and clear’ aspect of a sale under 
§ 363(f).”). 
 88 Constitutional mootness requires that an actual controversy exist at all times throughout litigation. 
Mills v. Green, 159 U.S. 651, 653 (1895); see also ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES 
AND POLICIES 160 (3d ed. 2006). Equitable mootness, like statutory mootness, may moot still live 
controversies. See Cont’l Airlines, 91 F.3d at 569 (calling the doctrine of equitable mootness a misnomer 
because it considers equities rather than the controversies). 
 89 In re UNR Indus., Inc., 20 F.3d 766, 769 (7th Cir. 1994). 
 90 See Nordhoff Inv., Inc. v. Zenith Elecs. Corp., 258 F.3d 180, 185 (3d Cir. 2001); see generally 
Matthew D. Pechous, Comment, Walking the Tight Rope and Not the Plank: A Proposed Standard for Second-
Level Appellate Review of Equitable Mootness Determinations, 28 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 547 (2012) 
(outlining the standards of review used by courts on appeal—de novo or abuse of discretion). 
 91 These factors are: (1) Whether a stay has been sought or obtained; (2) whether the plan has been 
substantially consummated; (3) whether the relief requested would affect the rights of third parties; (4) whether 
the relief requested would affect the success of the confirmed plan; and (5) the public policy of affording 
finality to bankruptcy judgments. Search Mkt. Direct, Inc. v. Jubber (In re Paige), 584 F.3d 1327, 1338 (10th 
Cir. 2009) (internal citation omitted). For a discussion for the various approaches and variations of this test, 
see Caroline L. Rosiek, Note, Making Equitable Mootness Equal: The Need for a Uniform Approach to 
Appeals in the Context of Bankruptcy Reorganization Plans, 57 SYRACUSE L. REV. 685, 697–704 (2007). 
 92 The Code elsewhere defines substantial consummation as the “(A) transfer of all or substantially all of 
the property proposed by the plan to be transferred; (B) assumption by the debtor or by the successor to the 
debtor under the plan of the business or of the management of all or substantially all of the property dealt with 
by the plan; and (C) commencement of distribution under the plan.” 11 U.S.C. § 1101(2) (2006). 
 93 Nordhoff, 258 F.3d at 185 (quoting In re PWS Holding Corp., 228 F.3d 224, 236 (3d Cir. 2000)). 
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the buyer.94 Although obtaining a stay pending appeal prevents the sale from 
consummating and preserves the right to appeal, doing so can prove 
challenging in the backdrop of a debtor urging a quick sale. 
C. Stay Pending Appeal 
The right to appeal is not an absolute right—it is subject to a concern for 
finality.95 The court of appeals, bankruptcy appellate panel (if existent), district 
court, or bankruptcy court may hear appeals from final bankruptcy 
judgments.96 A party may motion directly to a higher court to hear an appeal 
only if such motion shows why relief was not obtained from the bankruptcy 
court.97 A party has fourteen days from the entry of judgment to file a notice of 
appeal.98 While other federal appeals allow thirty days,99 bankruptcy appeals 
are allowed less time to prevent delays in the administration of the case.100 
Filing an appeal does not itself halt any order of the court; a stay pending 
appeal is necessary.101 
Convincing the court to delay an authorized transaction with a stay pending 
appeal requires the movant to meet a heavy burden.102 A stay pending appeal is 
similar to a preliminary injunction;103 it is an extraordinary remedy at the 
court’s discretion.104 Rule 8005 governs the procedure for obtaining a stay 
pending appeal.105 A movant must be able to provide a supersedeas bond.106 
 
 94 Frito-Lay Co. v. LTV Steel Co. (In re Chateaugay Corp.), 10 F.3d 944, 952–53 (2d Cir. 1993); see 
also UNR Indus., 20 F.3d at 769 (discussing the inability to “unscramble an egg”). 
 95 John P. Hennignan, Toward Regularizing Appealability in Bankruptcy, 12 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 
583, 584, 588–89 (1996). 
 96 28 U.S.C. § 158(d)(2)(A). In 2005, Congress added this option to allow a party to appeal directly to the 
court of appeals. Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub. L. no. 109-8, 
§ 1233, 119 Stat. 23, 202–04 (2005). 
 97 FED. R. BANKR. P. 8005. 
 98 Id. 8002(a). 
 99 FED. R. APP. P. 4(a)(1)(A). 
 100 FED. R. BANKR. P. 8002, advisory committee note. 
 101 28 U.S.C. § 158(d)(2)(D). The requirement for a stay pending appeal furthers the interest of finality by 
preventing an authorized action from consummating when there is still a chance the authorized action will be 
modified. Vlasek v. Levey (In re Vlasek), 325 F.3d 955, 961–62 (7th Cir. 2003). 
 102 In re Gen. Motors Corp., 409 B.R. 24, 30 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009) (citations omitted). 
 103 6 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY PRACTICE GUIDE ¶ 117.11 (Alan N. Resnick & Henry J. Sommer 
eds.,16th ed. 2012) (citing Rockwell Int’l Corp. v, White Motor Corp. (In re White Motor Corp.), 25 B.R. 293, 
297 (N.D. Ohio 1982)). 
 104 Edith H. Jones, Bankruptcy Appeals, 16 T. MARSHALL L. REV. 245, 269, 272 (1991) (citing Hartigan v. 
Pine Lake Vill. Apartment Co. (In re Pine Lake Vill. Apartment Co.), 21 B.R. 395, 398 (S.D.N.Y. 1982)). 
 105 FED. R. BANKR. P. 8005. A motion for a stay pending appeal must be presented to a bankruptcy judge 
in the first instance. Id. 
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The bond makes it difficult to secure a stay, particularly for larger 
transactions.107 However, if the appealing party does not prevail, payment of 
the bond indemnifies the party whose action the stay pending appeal halts.108 
Rule 8005 does not provide guidance on the criteria for consideration of a 
stay pending appeal, nor does the Rule require the court to specify its 
reasoning in a denial of a stay.109 Many courts have adopted a four-factor test 
when considering a motion for a stay pending appeal:110 
(1) Whether the appellant made a substantial showing of likelihood 
to succeed on the merits on appeal; 
(2) whether the appellant will suffer irreparable injury absent the 
stay; 
(3) whether a stay would substantially harm the other parties in the 
litigation; and 
(4) whether a stay is in the public interest.111 
There is significant variance among the courts as to how to weigh these 
factors.112 The majority of courts hold that the movant bears the burden of 
persuading the court on all the factors.113 Conversely, the minority says that 
none of these factors are dispositive but are weighed against one and other.114 
 
 106 A party who cannot provide this bond has the additional requirement of showing why the bond should 
deviate from the full amount. Richard S. Kanowitz & Michael A. Klein, The Divergent Interpretations of the 
Standard Governing Motions for Stay Pending Appeal of Bankruptcy Court Orders, 17 J. BANKR. L. & PRAC. 
Art. 3 (2008), available at Westlaw, 17 J. Bankr. L. & Prac. 4. 
 107 George W. Kuney, Slipping into Mootness, in NORTON ANNUAL SURVEY OF BANKRUPTCY LAWS, 2007 
EDITION (2007). FED R. BANKR. P. 7062 incorporates FED. R. CIV. P. 62(d), which does not specify how to 
calculate a bond amount, but courts have read in the requirements of the rule’s predecessor, to require some 
proportion of the judgment remaining unsatisfied. Poplar Grove Planting & Refining Co. v. Bache Halsey 
Stuart, Inc., 600 F.2d 1189, 1191 (5th Cir. 1979). 
 108 ACC Bondholder Grp. v. Adelphia Commc’ns Corp. (In re Adelphia Commc’ns Corp.), 361 B.R. 337, 
368 n.167 (S.D.N.Y. 2007). 
 109 Since a movant appealing the denial of a stay to a higher court must provide it, an applicant is 
implicitly entitled to the court’s reasoning if it rejects a stay. 10 COLLIER, supra note 10, ¶ 8005.11. 
 110 E.g., In re Roth American, Inc., 90 B.R. 94, 95 (Bankr. M.D. Pa. 1988) (citing In re Fosko Markets, 
Inc., 74 B.R. 384 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1987)); In re Crescenzi, 58 B.R. 141, 143 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1986); In re 
Beker Indus. Corp., 57 B.R. 611, 632, 633 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1986).  
 111 10 COLLIER, supra note 10, ¶ 8005.08. 
 112 Kanowitz & Klein, supra note 106. 
 113 E.g., Hertz Corp. v. ANC Rental Corp. (In re ANC Rental Corp.), No. 01-11220, 2002 WL 1058196, 
at *2 (D. Del. May 22, 2002) (citing In re Blackwell, 162 B.R. 117, 120 (E.D. Pa. 1993)); Ohanian v. Irwin (In 
re Irwin), 338 B.R. 839, 843 (E.D. Cal. 2006); In re Tower Automotive, Inc., No. 05-10578, 2006 WL 
2583624, at *1 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2006). 
 114 Adelphia, 361 B.R. at 347 (citing Mohammed v. Reno, 309 F.3d 95, 101 (2d Cir. 2002)); see also 
Commonwealth Nat’l Bank v. Dobslaw (In re Dobslaw), 20 B.R. 922, 924 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1982) (citing 
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When considering these factors, bankruptcy courts face the difficult task of 
weighing management’s assertions of a sale’s necessity against the fairness to 
the creditor of barring an appeal.115 The first factor, likelihood to succeed on 
the merits, is problematic. If a judge has used her discretion to authorize an 
expedited § 363 sale, she believed it was necessary for the reorganization and 
is unlikely to find that an appeal to the contrary would succeed.116 For the 
second factor, irreparable injury, courts are split on whether the risk of 
mootness itself constitutes irreparable injury.117 Most courts hold that 
mootness does not constitute irreparable harm, since this threat exists in any 
bankruptcy proceeding.118 In In re Adelphia, the Court for the Southern District 
of New York adopted the minority view.119 The court reasoned that absent a 
stay, the strong possibility of mooting an appeal of significant claims of error 
constitutes irreparable harm.120 Denying a stay pending appeal ensures 
meritorious claims “will never be heard on appeal due to mootness—a 
quintessential form of prejudice—which will inevitably result from the 
substantial consummation.”121 The Adelphia court found such prejudice greatly 
 
Constructors Assoc. v. Kreps, 573 F.2d 811, 815 (3d. Cir. 1978)) aff’d sub nom. In re Ashe, 712 F.2d 864 (3d 
Cir. 1983). 
 115 Russell A. Eisenberg & Frances Gecker, Due Process and Bankruptcy: A Contradiction in Terms?, 10 
BANKR. DEV. J. 47, 62 (1993). 
 116 E.g., In re Gen. Credit Corp., 283 B.R. 658, 659–60 (S.D.N.Y. 2002); N. Am. Enters. v. Fincke (In re 
Access Cardiosystems), 340 B.R. 656, 660 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2006); In re Deep, 288 B.R. 27, 30 (Bankr. 
N.D.N.Y. 2003); Miraj & Sons, Inc., 201 B.R. 23, 26–27 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1996); In re Public. Serv. Co. of 
N.H., 116 B.R. 347, 348–49 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1990); see also Kenneth S. Leonetti and & Euripides 
Dalmanieras, Procedural Issues in Bankruptcy Appeals, 17 A.B.I. NORTHEAST BANKRUPTCY CONFERENCE 
AND NORTHEAST CONSUMER FORUM 195, 247, available at Westlaw, 070810 ABI-CLE 195 (citing 
Albiococco v. Albiococco (In re Albicocco), No. 06-3409, 2006 WL 2620464, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 13, 
2006)). 
 117 Country Squire Assocs., L.P. v. Rochester Cmty. Sav. Bank (In re Country Squire Assocs., L.P.), 203 
B.R. 182, 183 n.1 (B.A.P. 2d Cir. 1996); Adelphia, 361 B.R. at 347–48 (citing cases in the Second Circuit 
supporting the affirmative position in Daly v. St. Germain (In re Norwich Historic Pres. Trust, L.L.C.), No. 
3:05CV12(MRK), 2005 WL 977067 (D. Conn. Apr. 21, 2005)); In re St. Johnsbury Trucking Co., 185 B.R. 
687, 690 (S.D.N.Y. 1995); see also In re Herrera, 2010 WL 148182 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. Jan. 8, 2010); In re 
Gen. Motors Corp., 409 B.R. 24, 31 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009) (accepting the threat of equitable mootness is 
enough to get on the “scoreboard”); Williams v. George Junior Republic (In re Cujas), 376 B.R. 480 (Bankr. 
E.D. Pa. 2007). 
 118 See In re Baker, No. CV05-3487, 2005 WL 2105802, at *9 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 31, 2005) (“As other 
courts have noted, the possibility that an appeal will be rendered moot by a denial of stay does not, in and of 
itself, constitute irreparable harm.”); see also Sunflower Racing, Inc. v. Mid-Continent Racing & Gaming (In 
re Sunflower Racing, Inc.), 223 B.R. 222, 225 (D. Kan.1998) (collecting cases). 
 119 Adelphia, 361 B.R. at 347–48. 
 120 Id. 
 121 Id. at 368. 
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outweighed any financial harm from granting a stay pending appeal, 
particularly since posting bond would ameliorate such financial harm.122 
Courts often do not get to the consideration of the third and fourth factors 
because the assessments of likelihood of success or irreparable harm are 
compelling enough.123 Nonetheless, the third and fourth factors meld together 
and skew against the movant. The approval of an urgent sale indicates that 
delaying the sale would harm a debtor, particularly if an expectant buyer may 
walk away when faced with a delay.124 The public interest lies with facilitating 
an economically beneficial speedy reorganization that benefits the public,125 
but courts rarely mention the public interest of protecting creditors.126 
If a party fails to obtain a stay pending appeal for a sale order, § 363(m) 
will quickly moot any chance for a remedy for an aggrieved creditor. In 
considering a motion for stay pending appeal, the debtor’s interests in 
reorganization outweigh the creditor’s grievances, yet the creditors have no 
chance for further remediation once the motion is denied. 
II. HOW THE DEBTOR’S EXIGENCY OUTWEIGHS THE CREDITORS’ DUE 
PROCESS RIGHTS 
In re Chrysler LLC and In re General Motors Corp. were cases in which 
the need for speed proved weightier than concerns about the sale process and 
creditor rights. Perhaps those situations merited the emergency treatment, but 
the creditors could not appeal to a higher court their concerns that the sale 
circumvented priorities, garnered them a sub-optimal return, or constituted a 
sub rosa plan. A powerful party, the U.S. government, propelled the speedy 
sale confirmations. Embracing a deferential standard that placed the debtors’ 
need for reorganization before meaningful due process, the courts paved the 
 
 122 Id. 
 123 Hunt v. Bankers Trust Co., 799 F.2d 1060, 1067 (5th Cir. 1986) (finding there was not a likelihood of 
success on the merits); Rally Auto Grp., Inc. v. Gen. Motors LLC (In re Motors Liquidation Co.), No. M-
47(RPP), 2010 WL 4449425, at *3–4 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 29, 2010) (rejecting that the appellant would suffer 
irreparable harm, so a stay is not in the public interest); In re McKenzie, No. A09-78963-PWB, 2009 WL 
6499259, at *2 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. Oct. 30, 2009) (finding that there was not substantial likelihood of success on 
appeal); FFG-NJ Vehicle Funding Corp. v. Holtmeyer (In re Holtmeyer), 229 B.R. 579, 582–83 (E.D.N.Y. 
1999) (finding the appeal was doomed to failure, and even if it was not, there would be no irreparable harm). 
 124 See infra Part II.A.2 (discussing the Chrysler and GM courts reliance on the buyer demands). 
 125 See e.g., In re Savage & Assoc., P.C., No. 05 CIV.2072 (SAS), 2005 WL 488643, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Feb 
28, 2005) (“[P]ublic interest favors the expedient administration of the bankruptcy proceedings . . . .”); Va. 
Dep’t of Med. Assistance Servs. v. Shenandoah Realty Partners, 248 B.R. 505, 515 (W.D. Va. 2000). 
 126 See Part I.A.2. 
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road for impatient buyers to hold courts hostage to threats of compromising the 
reorganization. Recognizing the potential unfairness to creditors, some courts 
have injected a more equitable approach to § 363(m) by allowing appeals when 
the court can fashion relief without compromising the principles of finality. 
A. Chrysler & GM 
The prominence and controversy surrounding the General Motors and 
Chrysler bankruptcies garnered attention to the problems of expedited § 363 
sales.127 Some criticisms focused on the judges favoring the goal of saving the 
companies rather than the Code’s statutory goal of paying back the creditors.128 
Though the U.S. government’s involvement in these cases seems 
exceptional,129 the cases established influential precedent on what constitutes 
the melting ice cube scenario that necessitates expedition,130 but focused little 
on the minimum protections for creditors. 131 
In Chrysler,132 the U.S. government exerted its hefty leverage on the debtor 
and the court to get the sale done unprecedentedly quickly.133 In the sale 
agreement, product liability claimants were cut off and the secured creditors’ 
priorities were ignored, in favor of retirees.134 Since the sales agreement 
formed New Chrysler, some critics argued that Chrysler was not a sale at all, 
but a hurried reorganization.135 Fiat was the asset buyer, but it had no money at 
stake: the U.S. government provided financing for the deal.136 Since Fiat had 
nothing to lose, it would never have walked away from the deal,137 but a drawn 
out process was not in the interest of the U.S. government.138 After the sale’s 
approval, the court denied the Indiana Pensioners’ request for a stay pending 
 
 127 Adler, supra note 29; E.g., Brubaker & Tabb, supra note 44; David, supra note 26; Roe & Skeel, supra 
note 29.  
 128 Ashby Jones & Mike Spector, Creditors Cry Foul at Chrysler Precedent, WALL ST. J., June 13, 2009, 
at B1. 
 129 Fishman & Gouveia, supra note 36. 
 130 See supra note 26. 
 131 See Bussel & Klee, supra note 37, at 666 (suggesting that “legitimacy was unduly sacrificed for 
expediency” in these cases). 
 132 In re Chrysler LLC, 405 B.R. 84, 89 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009), aff’d sub nom. Ind. State Police Pension 
Trust v. Chrysler LLC (In re Chrysler LLC), 576 F.3d 108, 111 (2d Cir. 2009), aff’d, 556 U.S. 960, 960 
(2009), vacated, 130 S. Ct. 1015 (2009), remanded 592 F.3d 370 (2d Cir. 2010). 
 133 See Roe & Skeel, supra note 29, at 750. 
 134 Secured creditors only received $0.29 on the dollar. Id. at 730–33. 
 135 Id. at 759. 
 136 Chrysler, 405 B.R. at 90–92. 
 137 Roe & Skeel, supra note 29, at 750. 
 138 Id. 
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appeal.139 The court cited the same reasoning that led it to approve the 
emergency sale—the necessity of the sale for a successful reorganization—and 
did not address the merits of the movants’ objections.140 
Similarly, in GM, the court’s authorization order emphasized the threat to 
the debtor of not consummating the sale quickly.141 The court noted that the 
continuing loss of revenue and market share would have grave effects and the 
sale had to go forward to avoid liquidation.142 Like in Chrysler, there was no 
true market valuation of the assets sold.143 The sale took place too quickly and 
bidding was restricted to bidders willing to accept the United Auto Workers’ 
liabilities as a condition of purchase.144 Although this pre-condition lowered 
the sale value, the court said it was acceptable because the price was greater 
than what the bidders would have received through liquidation.145 
1. Exception or the Rule? The Impact of Chrysler and GM 
Although these cases were exceptional, they set precedent for rushing 
through sales and past procedural safeguards. Despite suggestions that 
Chrysler and GM were exceptional bankruptcy situations,146 this Comment 
argues that the rule of law must prevail even in the so-called exceptional case. 
The Code grants judges discretion for these exceptional cases, within certain 
parameters; these extraordinary cases, which curtail creditor protections, call 
for sparse usage, not universal applicability.147 
Arguing for the necessity of the expeditious sales, the debtors in both 
Chrysler and GM did not give narrow emergency justifications, but rather 
justifications difficult to distinguish from those present in all large 
 
 139 In re Chrysler LLC, No. 009-50002 AJG, 2009 WL 7386569, at *1 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. May 20, 2009). 
 140 The movants claimed that the order was not legal under title 11 and also questioned the 
constitutionality of the sale. Id. at *3. The Supreme Court vacated the appeal as moot without the addressing 
any issues of constitutionality. Ind. State Police Pension Trust v. Chrysler LLC (In re Chrysler LLC), 130 S. 
Ct. 1015 (2009), remanded, 592 F.3d 370 (2d Cir. 2010). 
 141 See In re Gen. Motors Corp., 407 B.R. 463, 485 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009). 
 142 Id. at 484; see also Debtors’ Motion to Approve the Sale at 5, In re Gen. Motors Corp., 409 B.R. 24 
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009) (No. 09-50026), 2009 WL 1529573. 
 143 Adler, supra note 29, at 312. 
 144 Id. 
 145 Gen. Motors, 407 B.R. at 485. 
 146 Stephen J. Lubben, No Big Deal: The GM and Chrysler Cases in Context, 83 AM. BANKR. L.J. 531, 
531 (2009); see A. Joseph Warburton, Understanding the Bankruptcies of Chrysler and General Motors: A 
Primer, 60 SYRACUSE L. REV. 531, 579 (2010) (outlining critics and supporters views of the two 
bankruptcies). 
 147 See infra Part II.D.5.b. 
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bankruptcies. In both cases, the courts relied on the fact that the financers 
conditioned their commitment upon the consummation of the deal within a 
short time frame.148 In Chrysler, the U.S. government set a sixty-day deadline 
to resolve the bankruptcy, but it is unclear why this deadline was imperative.149 
Chrysler argued that without assurance of the deal’s speedy consummation, 
consumer confidence would decline and Chrysler would not be able to secure 
its supplier or dealer networks.150 Its failure would lead to the loss of thousands 
of jobs and have a domino effect within the auto industry because of Chrysler’s 
prominence.151 Nonetheless, Chrysler did not provide evidence that the deal 
could not be consummated without holding the judicial system hostage to an 
expedited process.  
Any financer can make demands based upon arbitrary deadlines. Most 
buyers would prefer that a purchase close as soon as possible, particularly 
since once that sale closes, the sale is enshrouded from appeal. It is difficult to 
imagine any large bankruptcy that does not have grave impacts on employees, 
distribution channels, and customers. The melting ice cube illustrated by these 
cases imported mere speculative threats of harm—the impending threat of loss 
of confidence and subsequent failure—as justification for expedition of rights. 
These cases demonstrated the potential for abuse when there is one 
powerful creditor—here, the U.S. government.152 A large creditor or 
dominating force in an industry could also exert the imposing influence that 
the government did in these cases.153 In Chrysler, a government-imposed 
deadline propelled the court to work through 850 objections in three days.154 
With little time to prepare their objections, and severely abridged time for 
court consideration, creditor’s grievances unlikely received thorough 
consideration. An expedited proceeding, where the balance of information and 
control of reorganization heavily favors the debtor, provides ample opportunity 
to cut off creditors with little power.155 
 
 148 Roe & Skeel, supra note 29, at 750 (explaining that the U.S. Treasury was simultaneously preparing 
the GM deal and would unlikely walk if the deal was not approved on the June 15 deadline). 
 149 Id. 
 150 See Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion to Debtors and Debtors in Possession at 11–12, In re 
Old Carco LLC, No. 09-50002, 2011 WL 2752222 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. May 2, 2011), 2009 WL 5131346. 
 151 See id. at 12–13. 
 152 Adler, supra note 29, at 315. 
 153 Cf. Brubaker & Tabb, supra note 44, at 1405–06. 
 154 Micheline Maynard, Automakers’ Swift Cases in Bankruptcy Shock Experts, N.Y. TIMES, July 7, 2009, 
at B1. 
 155 See Roe & Skeel, supra note 29, at 763 (suggesting that the government does not need to be entity 
providing the funding to exert its power). 
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2. A Roadmap for Impatient Buyers 
Recent cases from the Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New 
York demonstrate the precedential value Chrysler and GM had in allowing 
buyers to demand a quick process.156 In In re GSC, the court relied on both GM 
and Chrysler to approve a quick sale of all the debtor’s assets to Black 
Diamond.157 In GSC, the court focused on the business justification for the 
sale. Citing GM, the court reasoned that without the sale, the assets would lose 
value and consumer confidence would decline.158 For GSC, the court 
appointed a trustee to manage the reorganization and relied on the trustee’s 
consideration and rejection of four alternative courses of actions before 
pursuing the sale to Black Diamond.159 More troubling was the court’s 
treatment of Black Diamond’s demands for the sale. The court approved the 
quick sale because it reasoned that even if Black Diamond would have waited 
through any delays, Black Diamond was unlikely to offer the same value in the 
future because of the additional administrative costs.160 The court reasoned that 
any delay would expose the company to the unnecessary risk of losing key 
employees and diminishing investor confidence.161  
By accepting a speculative threat of suboptimal results of GSC’s 
reorganization, the court provided an instruction manual for impatient buyers 
to hold the procedural protections of bankruptcy hostage. All reorganizations 
benefit from speed,162 but the justification for expedition must weigh the rights 
being abridged more heavily than a mere possibility of suboptimal 
consequences from the lack of speed. If a debtor’s management has a preferred 
buyer (the sale to whom flouts the best interests of the creditors), this 
instruction manual could guide the demands a buyer should make to ensure a 
speedy sale authorization. 
The § 363 process heavily favors debtors; dissatisfied creditors must 
produce very compelling evidence before their interests could counter the 
 
 156 E.g., In re GSC, Inc., 453 B.R. 132, 155 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2011); In re Bos. Generating, LLC, 440 
B.R. 302, 329 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2010); In re Metaldyne Corp., 409 B.R. 671, 678 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009), 
aff’d, 421 B.R. 620 (S.D.N.Y. 2009). 
 157 GSC, Inc., 453 B.R. 132, 166 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2011). 
 158 Id. (citing In re Gen. Motors, 407 B.R. 463, 492–93). 
 159 See id. 
 160 Id. at 166–67. 
 161 Id. at 169. 
 162 See supra Part I.A.1. 
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debtor’s assertions. Unfair treatment would be curbed by imposing a more 
rigid burden of evidence to speed past due process safeguards.163 
B. Valid Business Purpose & Potential Conflicts of Interests 
Historically, courts skeptical of sales outside of chapter 11 required a 
showing of an emergency before approving a sale.164 Today, courts give more 
deference to the reorganizing company’s management and only require a valid 
business purpose for a sale.165 
A valid business purpose is necessary for both the sale and not waiting for 
a reorganization plan to complete the sale.166 In re Lionel gave rise to the valid 
business purpose test, which recognized that while bankruptcy judges need 
flexibility to fashion relief and facilitate successful reorganizations, flexibility 
does not give debtors carte blanche to evade the Code.167 The valid business 
purpose test listed non-exclusive factors for consideration of a sale motion: 
proportionate value of assets to the whole business, amount of time elapsed 
since the filing, likelihood a plan of reorganization will be proposed and 
confirmed in the near future, effects of proposed disposition on future 
reorganization, proceeds to be obtained, the § 363 method of disposition, and 
whether the asset is increasing or decreasing in value.168 The Lionel factors 
rely on the notion that the disposition of assets is an incremental step of the 
plan process, not a means of disposing of the bankruptcy case altogether (as 
§ 363 sales are commonly used now).169 Because of the transformation in how 
debtors employ § 363, some courts have suggested a new set of criteria for 
evaluating motions for a sale.170 
 
 163 See generally Russell A. Eisenberg & Frances F. Gecker, The Doctrine of Necessity and Its 
Parameters, 73 MARQ. L. REV. 1 (1989). 
 164 COLLIER, supra note 10, ¶ 363.02 (citing In re Solar Mfg. Corp., 176 F.2d 493 (3d Cir. 1949)). 
 165 Id. 
 166 In re Bos. Generating, LLC, 440 B.R. 302, 329 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2010). 
 167 Comm. of Equity Sec. Holders v. Lionel Corp. (In re Lionel), 722 F.2d 1063, 1071 (2d. Cir. 1983). 
 168 Id. 
 169 Supra notes 3–4 and accompanying text; see Baird, supra note 3, at 81. 
 170 See generally In re Chrysler LLC, 405 B.R. 84, 95 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009), aff’d sub nom. Ind. State 
Police Pension Trust v. Chrysler LLC (In re Chrysler LLC), 576 F.3d 108, 111 (2d Cir. 2009), aff’d, 556 U.S. 
960, 960 (2009), vacated, 130 S. Ct. 1015 (2009), remanded, 592 F.3d 370 (2d Cir. 2010) (explaining that 
whether an asset is a “melting ice cube” with decreasing value and little prospect of continuing business 
operations is the overriding factor); see also Jessica Uziel, Comment, Section 363(B) Restructuring Meets the 
Sound Business Purpose Test with Bite: An Opportunity to Rebalance the Competing Interests of Bankruptcy 
Law, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 1189, 1196 (2011) (discussing factors adopted in In re Gulf Coast Oil Corp., 404 B.R. 
407, 418 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2009)). 
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The GM court embraced the Lionel factors but expanded upon them.171 It 
listed four additional factors: 
1. Does the estate have the liquidity to survive until 
confirmation of a plan? 
2. Will the sale opportunity still exist as of the time of plan 
confirmation? 
3. If not, how likely is it that there will be a satisfactory 
alternative sale opportunity, or a stand-alone plan 
alternative that is equally desirable (or better) for creditors? 
4. Is there a material risk that by deferring the sale, the patient 
will die on the operating table?172 
Careful to assert that it was not departing from § 363 precedent, the court 
explained that these supplemental factors still address Lionel’s original 
question of whether there is a good reason to confirm the sale prior to the 
confirmation of a plan.173 These supplemental factors rest on the DIP’s 
speculation on the necessity of the sale, rather than the more objective Lionel 
factors. The deference afforded in these “supplemental” factors nonetheless 
suggests they do supplant the Lionel factors.174 
In GM, the court focused on plummeting consumer confidence as the 
impetus for completing the sale quickly.175 Despite acknowledging that the 
U.S. government would not walk away if the court took extra time for 
authorization, the court approved the quick sale because no other qualified 
bidders would emerge before the assets deteriorated in value.176 Guided by this 
precedent, the In re Boston Generating court applied these new factors to find 
that the debtor did not have sufficient liquidity to survive until confirmation of 
a plan, given the costs and time of confirming a contested plan.177 
The Lionel valid business purpose threshold for approving a sale derives 
from a wealth of corporate law holding that managers are better suited to make 
business decisions, but the valid business purpose test does not capture the 
 
 171 In re Gen. Motors, 407 B.R. 463, 490 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009). 
 172 Id. 
 173 Id. 
 174 See id. 
 175 Id. at 492. 
 176 Id. at 492–93. 
 177 In re Bos. Generating, LLC, 440 B.R. 302, 328–29 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2010). 
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same skepticism with regards to conflicts of interest. In corporate law, as long 
as the management acted in good faith and with due care in making decisions, 
judges will not second guess business judgments in retrospect.178 Bankruptcy 
courts recognize that same principle: judges are no better equipped for making 
business decisions for insolvent companies than solvent ones.179  
Corporate law affords less deference when self-interest may cloud 
management’s judgment.180 While bankruptcy courts are skeptical of 
“insider”181 transactions, conflicts of interest other than those enumerated by 
Code’s definition of “insider” may arise. Though large creditors as buyers in 
§ 363 sales raise similar concerns to those created by insider transactions, they 
do not fit within this definition. A debtor’s management is inevitably biased in 
favor of survival rather than economic efficiency or fair distribution to 
creditors.182 By calling the bluff of a powerful creditor exerting leverage, 
management runs the risk of dooming the reorganization and its own job 
security.183 In bankruptcy, management’s prior incentives as equity holders184 
disappear since equity interests are subordinate to creditors;185 thus, 
management has little to lose by acceding to buyer demands.186 Buyers can use 
this leverage to manufacture a valid business purpose to get the sale done as 
quickly as possible.187 Once the sale order is final, appeals of the sale are moot. 
 
 178 Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954 (Del. 1985) (“The business judgment rule is a 
presumption that in making a business decision the directors of a corporation acted on an informed basis, in 
good faith and in the honest belief that the action taken was in the best interests of the company.” (internal 
quotation marks omitted) (quoting Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984))). 
 179 Agarwal v. Pomona Valley Med. Grp. (In re Pomona Valley Med. Grp.), 476 F.3d 665, 670 (9th Cir. 
2007). However, other countries automatically remove existing management once a company is insolvent, 
believing insolvency demonstrates their ineptitude. Ziad Raymond Azar, Bankruptcy Policy: A Review and 
Critique of Bankruptcy Statutes and Practices in Fifty Countries Worldwide, 16 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 
279, 289–301 (2008) (outlining rationales for displacing management in bankruptcy). 
 180 E.g., DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 8, §§ 144, 271 (2012); REVISED MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT §§ 8.61, 12.02 
(2008). 
 181 See 11 U.S.C. § 101(31)(b) (2006). 
 182 Charles Jordan Tabb, Emergency Preferential Orders in Bankruptcy Reorganizations, 65 AM. BANKR. 
L.J. 75, 79 (1991) (citing Otte v. Mfrs. Hanover Commercial Corp. (In re Texlon Corp.), 596 F.2d 1092, 1098 
(2d Cir. 1979); In re FCX, Inc., 54 B.R. 833, 838 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 1985)). 
 183 Tabb, supra note 182, at 79. 
 184 Corporations often align corporate and managerial interests through equity ownership. Tabb, supra 
note 182, at 79. 
 185 Case v. L.A. Lumber Prods. Co., 308 U.S. 106, 120 (1939) (stating it has long been a tenet of 
bankruptcy that debt creditors are entitled to priority over stockholders). 
 186 Tabb, supra note 182, at 79. 
 187 See infra Part II.A.2. 
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C. Interpretations of Section 363(m) Mootness 
There is broad agreement among courts on the importance of protecting 
good faith buyers, but the interpretation of § 363(m)’s breadth is not consistent 
among circuits.188 Many courts interpret § 363(m) to mandate a per se 
mootness rule anytime the appellant did not obtain a stay pending appeal, but 
some courts recognize narrow exceptions to the rule.189 These exceptions seek 
to remedy errors against creditors when such relief would not undermine 
finality. 
1. The Per Se Rule 
Many courts read § 363(m) broadly and adopt a per se rule that any appeal 
will be moot unless the movant obtained a stay.190 These courts hold that 
mootness applies even if the appeal would raise a question of whether property 
belonged to the estate191 or whether the issuing court had proper jurisdiction.192 
Courts that observe the per se rule find that even if the bankruptcy court erred 
in authorizing the sale, the appeal must be dismissed.193 Discussing the breadth 
of statutory mootness after denying an appeal, the Seventh Circuit, in In re 
Sax, explained that whether the court acted correctly does not matter, because 
“[s]ection 363(m) does not say that the sale must be proper under § 363(b); it 
says the sale must be authorized under § 363(b).”194 This reasoning produces 
an absurd result by which a court can act outside the scope of its authority, and 
 
 188 Compare In re Sax, 796 F.2d 994 (7th Cir. 1986), with Krebs Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc. v. Valley 
Motors, Inc., 141 F.3d 490 (3d Cir. 1998). 
 189 Despite the narrow exceptions, it is unclear whether these exceptions apply in any significant or 
consistent way. Kuney, supra note 107. For example, In re Rickel Home Centers, Inc., 209 F.3d 291 (3d Cir. 
2000) acknowledges the exception created in its circuit by Krebs, but reasons it does not apply in the case at 
bar. 
 190 E.g., Parker v. Goodman (In re Parker), 499 F.3d 616, 620–21 (6th Cir. 2007) (declining to adopt the 
Third Circuit’s approach); Sax, 796 F.2d at 997; United States v. Salerno, 932 F.2d 117, 122–23 (2d Cir. 
1991); Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Miller (In re Stadium Mgmt. Corp.), 895 F.2d 845, 847 (1st Cir. 1990); 
Cargill, Inc. v. Charter Int’l Oil Co. (In re Charter Co.), 829.F.2d 1054 (11th Cir. 1987); Magwood v. 
Pearlstein (In re Magwood), 785 F.2d 1077, 1080–81 (D.C. Cir. 1986). 
 191 See, e.g., Hazelbaker v. Hope Gas, Inc. (In re Rare Earth Minerals), 445 F.3d 359, 364 (4th Cir. 2006) 
(quoting Sax, 796 F.2d at 997–98); Campbell v. Motors Liquidation Co. (In re Motors Liquidation Co.), 428 
B.R. 43, 54–55 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). But see Rutherford Hosp., Inc. v. RNH P’ship, 168 F.3d 693, 699 (4th Cir. 
1999). 
 192 In re Edwards, 962 F.2d 641, 644 (7th Cir. 1992) (holding collateral appeals are not permissible); In re 
Gilchrist, 891 F.2d 559, 561 (5th Cir. 1990) (holding that finality precludes reversal because the appellant 
forfeited the opportunity to contest jurisdiction by not obtaining a stay). 
 193 See, e.g., Rare Earth Minerals, 445 F.3d 363; Canzano v. Ragosa (In re Colarusso), 382 F.3d 51, 62 
(1st Cir. 2004). 
 194 Sax, 796 F.2d at 997–98. 
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then be immune to future review.195 The Sax court explained that allowing 
reversal of the sale, despite lack of jurisdiction, would contravene the finality 
goals of 363(m).196 Because looking for exceptions would undermine the 
purpose of the provision, § 363(m) must be followed “precisely.”197 The court 
urged that the appellant should have obtained a stay immediately, and not 
doing so foreclosed the opportunity to appeal.198 Statutory mootness operates 
to preclude review and protect the good faith buyer, and whether the 
bankruptcy court’s action was substantively wrong in authorizing the sale is 
irrelevant.199 
2. Carving Holes into Statutory Mootness: Exceptions to the Rule 
Faced with the harshness of the per se rule, in the late 1990s, courts began 
exhibiting more willingness to review appeals.200 These courts reasoned that 
the plain language of § 363(m) does not preclude any relief, just the reversal or 
modification of the sale; thus, courts still have a duty to examine the feasibility 
of relief.201 Seeking to avoid a per se rule’s stark treatment to wronged 
 
 195 Parker v. Goodman (In re Parker), 499 F.3d 616, 623 (6th Cir. 2007) (citing Charter, 829 F.2d at 
1055–56); see also Rare Earth Minerals, 445 F.3d at 364 (explaining an exception to statutory mootness 
whenever a claimant asserts the property was not property of the estate would destroy the rule altogether). But 
see Rutherford Hosp., Inc., 168 F.3d at 699 (holding that the bankruptcy court does not have jurisdiction to 
allow a conveyance of property not part of the estate). 
 196 Sax, 796 F.2d at 998. 
 197 Id. 
 198 Id. at 997–98. 
 199 Canzano v. Ragosa (In re Colarusso), 382 F.3d 51, 62 (1st Cir. 2004) (quoting Tri-Can, Inc. v. Fallon 
(In re Tri-Can, Inc.), 98 B.R. 609, 618 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1989)); John M. Collen, Section 363(m) Title 
Endorsements, 4 J. BANKR. L. & PRAC. 531, 536 (1995) (citing United Mine Workers of Am. Combined Fund 
v. CF & I Fabricators (In re CF & I Fabricators), 169 B.R. 984, 992 (D. Utah 1994)). Contra Cal-Bay Int’l, 
Inc. v. Supertail Mfg. Co. (In re Supertrail Mfg. Co.), 383 F. App’x 475, 478 (5th Cir. 2010) (holding that 
§ 363(m) does not apply to assets not in the bankruptcy estate). 
 200 E.g., Contrarian Funds LLC v. Aretex LLC (In re Westpoint Stevens, Inc.), 600 F.3d 231, 249 (2d Cir. 
2010) (noting there may be a narrow exception when the challenge is divorced from the overall transaction and 
would not affect any of the purchaser’s reliance); Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors v. Trism, Inc. (In re 
Trism, Inc.), 328 F.3d 1003, 1006–07 (8th Cir. 2003) (holding there could be a narrow exception so long as the 
challenge would not affect the validity of the sale); Krebs Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc. v. Valley Motors, Inc., 141 
F.3d 490, 498–99 (3d Cir. 1998) (discussing the courts which adopt the majority approach and announcing an 
exception); Bullock v. Telluride Income Growth LP (In re Telluride Income Growth LP), 364 B.R. 407, 414 
(B.A.P. 10th Cir. 2007) (holding that a remedy “can be granted without affecting the validity of the sale”). 
 201 In re AOV Indus., Inc., 792 F.2d 1140, 1148 (D.C. Cir. 1986); see also Bank of N.Y. Trust Co. v. 
Official Unsecured Creditors’ Comm. (In re Pac. Lumber Co.), 584 F.3d 229, 241 (5th Cir. 2009); Trans 
World Airlines, Inc. v. Texaco, Inc. (In re Texaco Inc.), 92 B.R. 38, 44–45 (S.D.N.Y. 1988). 
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creditors, courts mimic the approach to equitable mootness.202 These courts 
consider whether they can fashion any relief before mooting an appeal for 
which a stay pending appeal was not obtained.203 Despite rejecting the per se 
rule, these courts carve out a narrow exception in which mootness will not 
operate—the strong policy favoring finality typically prevails. 204 
The exception view considers two factors before mooting an appeal: (1) 
whether there was a stay; and (2) whether the reversal or modification of the 
authorization would affect the validity of the sale.205 This construction of the 
exception imports no analysis outside of the words in § 363(m).206 The 
presence of a state law remedy, for instance, does not render the appeal on the 
merits moot.207 Courts have interpreted several other situations falling under 
this exception: the creditor-purchaser is party to the appeal and the court can 
exercise equitable principles to reverse the sale;208 the liquidation of assets in a 
commercially unreasonable manner, such as a fraudulent transfer;209 and 
appeals concerning the distribution of the proceeds of the closed sale.210 To 
moot an appeal, the proponent of mootness must demonstrate that there is no 
remedy available to the appellant.211 Courts reject motions for mootness when 
 
 202 See Manges v. Seattle-First Nat’l Bank (In re Magnes), 29 F.3d 1034, 1040 (5th Cir. 1994); see also 
Mac Panel Co. v. Va. Panel Corp., 283 F.3d 622, 625 (4th Cir. 2002) (explaining that courts apply a “totality 
of circumstances” test before mooting an appeal). 
 203 See supra note 200 and accompanying text; see also Colarusso, 382 F.3d at 62 (quoting Tri-Can, Inc., 
98 B.R. at 618). Contra Cal-Bay Int’l, Inc. v. Supertail Mfg. Co. (In re Supertrail Mfg. Co.), 383 F. App’x 
475, 478–81 (5th Cir. 2010) (holding that § 363(m) does not apply to assets not in the bankruptcy estate). 
 204 Contrarian Funds LLC v. Aretex LLC (In re WestPoint Stevens, Inc.), 600 F.3d 231, 248–49 (2d Cir. 
2010) (discussing the goal of protecting good faith buyers); see also Kuney, supra note 107.  
 205 Cinicola v. Scharffenberger, 248 F.3d 110, 128 (3d Cir. 2001) (citing Krebs Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc. v. 
Valley Motors, Inc., 141 F.3d 490, 499 (3d Cir. 1998)); see also Mission Iowa Wind Co. v. Enron Corp. (In re 
Enron Corp.), 291 B.R. 39, 41–42 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). 
 206 See supra Part I.B. 
 207 Suter v. Goedert, 504 F.3d 982, 990–91 (9th Cir. 2007). On remand, the district court upheld the 
bankruptcy court’s finding against the appellants, after the court considered the matter on the merits. Suter v. 
Goedert (In re Suter), 396 B.R. 535 (D. Nev. 2008). 
 208 Sun Valley Ranches, Inc. v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc’y (In re Sun Valley Ranches, Inc.), 823 
F.2d 1373, 1375 (9th Cir.1987); see also Taylor v. Lake (In re CADA Inv., Inc.), 664 F.2d 1158, 1160 (9th 
Cir. 1981); Willamette Water Front, Ltd. v. Victoria Station, Inc. (In re Victoria Station Inc.), 88 B.R. 231, 234 
(B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1988). Contra Gwinnett Bank & Trust Co. v. Matos (In re Matos), 790 F.2d 864, 856 n.3 
(11th Cir. 1986) (rejecting any contrast between statutory rights of redemption and sale of stock). 
 209 Hicks v. Brandt (In re Healthco Int’l, Inc.), 136 F.3d 45, 50–51 (1st Cir. 1998). 
 210 In re Lloyd, 37 F.3d 271, 273 (7th Cir. 1994); United States v. Salerno, 932 F.2d 117, 123 (2d Cir. 
1991) (holding that while an appeal concerning a sale order was moot, appellant was free to object to the 
distribution of the proceeds). 
 211 See Osborn v. Durant Bank & Trust Co. (In re Osborn), 24 F.3d 1199, 1203 (10th Cir. 1994), 
abrogated in part on other grounds by Eastman v. Union Pacific R.R. Co., 493 F.3d 1151 (10th Cir. 2007), 
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the movant fails to establish that there is no meaningful remedy available 
without invalidating the sale.212 
In 1998, the Third Circuit explicitly rejected a per se rule in Krebs 
Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc. v. Valley Motors, Inc., holding that an appeal is not 
moot if relief can be fashioned without affecting the validity of the sale.213 
Despite creating an exception, the court nonetheless dismissed appeal at bar as 
moot because any remedy would have affected the validity of the sale.214 
Circuit precedent dictated that any kind of attack on the sale price would 
impermissibly affect the validity of the sale.215 In Krebs, the appellant argued 
that a refund would come from another creditor (who was also the buyer), not 
an innocent third party.216 The court stated that the statute does not 
differentiate between buyers who are creditors and third-party buyers.217 The 
policy of finality prevailed because not mooting the sale would make bidders 
fear that the winning bid may not be the final sale price.218 
Although several circuits have embraced a similar exception, the breadth of 
what constitutes a challenge to the validity of the sale leaves unclear what kind 
of relief is possible, since nearly anything could challenge the validity of the 
sale. In In re Trism, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals interpreted “affecting 
the validity of the sale” as anything on which the purchaser relied when 
agreeing to the purchase.219 The court defined a provision as unalterable on 
appeal under § 363(m) if it is so closely linked to the agreement that modifying 
or reversing it would adversely affect the parties’ bargained-for-exchange.”220 
 
abrogated by Shayesteh v. Raty, 404 F. App’x. 298, (10th Cir. 2010) (holding that federal principles of judicial 
estoppel apply to both federal and pendent state-law claims but not addressing when mootness operates).  
 212 C.O.P. Coal Dev. Co. v. C.W. Mining Co. (In re C.W. Mining Co.), 641 F.3d 1235, 1239 (10th Cir. 
2011); Search Mkt. Direct, Inc. v. Jubber (In re Paige), 584 F.3d 1327, 1336–37 (10th Cir. 2009); Suter, 504 
F.3d at 986–87. 
 213 Krebs Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc. v. Valley Motors, Inc., 141 F.3d 490, 499 (3d Cir. 1998) (rejecting the 
per se rule, based on the interpretation of Third Circuit precedent in Resolution Trust Corp. v. Swedeland Dev. 
Grp., Inc. (In re Swedelend Dev. Grp., Inc.), 16 F.3d 552 (3d Cir. 1994) (en banc) that 11 U.S.C. § 364(e) does 
not provide that § 363(m) moots every appeal without a stay). 
 214 Krebs Chrysler-Plymouth, 141 F.3d at 500. 
 215 Id. (relying on Pittsburgh Food & Beverage Inc. v. Ranallo, 112 F.3d 645 (3d Cir. 1997)). 
 216 Id. 
 217 Id. 
 218 Id. (citing Pittsburgh Food & Beverage, 112 F.3d at 645). 
 219 Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors v. Trism, Inc. (In re Trism, Inc.), 328 F.3d 1003, 1006–07 (8th 
Cir. 2003). This provision was a release from any liability on avoidance claims for the majority shareholder. 
Id. at 1006. 
 220 Id. at 1007. 
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Although some courts and scholars contend that the exception to the per se 
rule is virtually toothless,221 it incorporates equitable principles to ensure that if 
an injustice can be remedied without undermining finality, the court should do 
so. Advocates of a per se rule may contend that leaving the door open to even a 
sliver of contention whether mootness will operate undermines the motivations 
for a strong a policy of finality;222 a buyer may worry that her case might fit 
into that ambit of the mysterious exception.223 However, narrowing § 363(m) 
to allow creditors an equitable form of relief has not deterred § 363 sales since 
the exception’s articulation over a decade ago in Delaware’s circuit, where 
sales have dramatically increased.224 
3. Clear Channel 
In 2008, a Bankruptcy Appellate Panel of the Ninth Circuit decision further 
chipped away at § 363(m) by holding that the mootness provision does not 
apply to subsection (f) of § 363 but only to subsections (b) and (c), in Clear 
Channel Outdoor, Inc. v. Knupfer (In re PW, LLC).225 The court’s reasoning 
focused on a plain language reading of the statute.226 Other circuits declined to 
follow this decision because it was against the weight of authority and 
subsection (f) only operates in conjunction with sales under subsection (b), 
thereby requiring the same mootness protections.227 In contrast with the Ninth 
Circuit’s narrow reading of the § 363(m), the Sixth Circuit applied § 363(m) to 
subsections (f) and (h).228 Courts that rejected Ninth Circuit’s reasoning held 
that buyers rely on the “free and clear” provision of § 363(f), and disturbing it 
 
 221 Contrarian Funds LLC v. Aretex LLC (In re WestPoint Stevens, Inc.), 600 F.3d 231, 249 (2d Cir. 
2010) (citing Kuney, supra note 107, at 271–72) (explaining the exception is so narrow, that for practical 
purposes, the Third Circuit has a per se rule). 
 222 In re Sax, 796 F.2d 994, 997–98 (7th Cir.1986) (discussing that any exception would undermine 
finality). 
 223 Collen, supra note 199, at 532 (discussing clients who are still skeptical that mootness will protect 
them). 
 224 See infra Appendix A, Chart 2. 
 225 Clear Channel Outdoor, Inc. v. Knupfer (In re PW, LLC), 391 B.R. 25, 35–36 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2008); 
see also 11 U.S.C. § 363(f) (2006); supra text accompanying note 12 (explaining § 363(f)). 
 226 The court noted that because the text of § 363(m) reads “[t]he reversal or modification on appeal of an 
authorization under subsection (b) or (c) of this section of a sale or lease of property does not affect the 
validity,” it does not apply to § 363(f). Clear Channel, 391 B.R. at 35 (emphasis added). 
 227 See Official Comms. of Unsecured Creditors v. Anderson Senior Living Props., LLC (In re Nashville 
Senior Living, LLC), 407 B.R. 222, 231 (B.A.P. 6th Cir. 2009) (discussing the courts that adopt its approach 
and finding that ultimately, the sale is made pursuant to subsection (b) or (c)), aff’d, 620 F.3d 584 (6th Cir. 
2010). 
 228 Id. at 228, 231. Section 363(h) pertains to the sale of co-owned property. See 11 U.S.C. § 363(h). 
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would alter the parties’ bargained-for exchange and thereby challenge the 
sale’s validity.229 
Since the Clear Channel decision, courts, including those in the Ninth 
Circuit, have continued to apply § 363(m) to § 363(f).230 Appellants may 
attempt to use Clear Channel as strategic leverage to try to circumvent 
mootness, but the result of Clear Channel was yet another equitable exception 
to § 363(m), with limited applicability.231 The Ninth Circuit BAP’s purpose 
was to avoid § 363(m)’s harsh results. Before assessing statutory mootness, the 
Clear Channel court first determined the decision was not equitably moot.232 
Recognizing the unfairness in denying an appeal when relief could still be 
equitably granted, the court then crafted an explanation as to why § 363(m) did 
not apply under the circumstances.233 
After the court’s decision, critics posited the death of § 363 sales, at least in 
the Ninth Circuit.234 Yet, three years later, evidence has not borne out these 
claims.235 Data indicates that motions for § 363 used sales in the Ninth Circuit 
do not vary from the trends in the most frequently used courts for § 363 
motions—the Southern District of New York and the District of Delaware.236 
 
 229 Asset Based Res. Grp., LLC v. U.S. Trustee (In re Polaroid Corp.), 611 F.3d 438, 441 (8th Cir. 2010) 
(citing Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors v. Trism, Inc. (In re Trism, Inc.), 328 F.3d 1003, 1007 (8th Cir. 
2003)); GAF Holdings, LLC v. Rinaldi (In re Farmland Indus.), 408 B.R. 497, 508–09 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. 2009). 
 230 See, e.g., In re Thorpe Insulation Co., No. 11-688 DSF, 2011 WL 1378537, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 11, 
2011); In re Namco Capital Grp., Inc., No. 10-0766 GAF, 2011 WL 2312090, at *2–3 (C.D. Cal. June 7, 
2011); In re Jolan, Inc., 403 B.R. 866, 867–69 (Bankr. W.D. Wash. 2009) (denying the motion but holding that 
Clear Channel does not prohibit such use of § 363). 
 231 James T. Markus, et al., Recent Developments in Asset Sales, in AMERICAN BANKRUPTCY INSTITUTE 
THIRD HAWAI’I BANKRUPTCY WORKSHOP, at *2–3 (2010), available at Westlaw, 081110 ABI-CLE 23. 
 232 Clear Channel Outdoor, Inc. v. Knupfer (In re PW, LLC), 391 B.R. 25, 33–35 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2008). 
 233 See id. at 35–37. 
 234 See, e.g., Richard J. Corbi, Section 363(f) “Free and Clear” Sales May Not Survive Appeal, 18 
NORTON J. BANKR. L. & PRAC. ART. 8 (Jan. 2009); Dennis J. Connolly & Sage M. Sigler, NORTON BANKR. L. 
ADVISER, Nov. 2008, available at Westlaw, 2008 No. 11 Norton Bankr. L. Adviser 2 (arguing that the terms of 
the sale cannot be treated separately on appeal; Joel H. Levitin et al., Ninth Circuit BAP Dresses Down 
Lienstripping—Could This Be the Last Dance for 363 Sales?, 27 AM. BANKR. INST. J., Oct. 2008, at 1, 53. 
 235 Jo Ann J. Brighton & Felton E. Parrish, Two Recent Decisions Show that § 363 Sales are Not Dead in 
the Ninth Circuit, AM. BANKR. INST. J., July–Aug. 2009, at 42, 42–43. 
 236 See infra Appendix A, Chart 3; Appendix B; see also Kenneth N. Russak, Section 363 Real Estate 
Sales Are Still Feasible After Clear Channel, L.A. LAW., Mar. 2009, at 10, 13–14 (“Rumors of the death of the 
363 sale are greatly exaggerated.”); Shirley S. Cho & Bennett L. Spiegel, Clear Channel Muddies the Waters 
of § 363(m) Mootness Protection, 26 No. 2 THE BANKRUPTCY STRATEGIST 1 (Dec. 2008) (predicting Clear 
Channel will not be followed in the Ninth Circuit or elsewhere). 
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D. The Difficulty of Getting an Appeal 
Though the exceptions to § 363(m) are narrow in scope, they aim to 
compensate for reversible errors made during the short authorization process. 
Since a creditor’s efforts to secure a stay pending appeal are often 
unsuccessful, an equitable reading of § 363(m) may be the only opportunity for 
retroactively protecting creditors’ due process rights. 
1. The Illusive Stay Pending Appeal 
Although Rule 6004(h) provides an automatic fourteen-day stay before any 
sale order consummates, it grants the judge discretion to shorten or eliminate 
the stay.237 In theory, the rule aims to avoid the race to court between a creditor 
(seeking to stop the sale) and a seller (seeking quick approval and mootness 
protection).238 In practice, courts almost always eliminate the stay, given the 
debtor’s push to complete the sale quickly.239 As discussed above, a stay 
pending appeal is an extraordinary remedy, and parties are unlikely to succeed 
on their motion.240 
Because Rule 6004(h) does not provide any guidance on when and why a 
court may eliminate this stay, courts regularly eliminate it. In contrast, Rule 
2002 requires a “cause shown” standard to shorten the time mandated for 
notice.241 Although “cause shown” is an amorphous test, the absence of this 
phrase in Rule 6004(h) explains the provision’s lack of fortitude.242 Rule 8017 
explicitly limits the duration of a stay pending appeal to thirty days, unless 
there is cause shown to extend it.243 If a potential appellant’s stay cannot be 
extended without cause shown, the same standard should apply for purging the 
fourteen-day stay. The small period could be enough time for a potential 
appellant to petition the court for review of a meritorious appeal. Although the 
Rules recognize a balancing of debtors’ needs against creditors’ rights, the 
toothless rule fails to give creditors’ rights much weight. 
 
 237 FED. R. BANKR. P. 6004(h). 
 238 COLLIER, supra note 10, ¶ 363.11. 
 239 Athanas, supra note 77. 
 240 See supra Part I.C. 
 241 FED. R. BANKR. P. 2002(a). 
 242 E.g., id. 1006(b)(2), 2002(a), 3015, 9006(b)(1). However, Rule 3020 and Rule 4002 provide analogous 
discretion for the judge to remove a fourteen-day stay. Id. 3020, 4002. 
 243 Id. 8017(b). 
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Noting the Rule’s lack of guidance on when to shorten the stay, the 
Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York in In re Borders 
Group, Inc. relied on the Collier treatise to interpret the Rule to have sharper 
teeth than most courts do.244 The treatise explains that a court should not lift 
the stay when objections have been raised, unless there is a showing of a 
business need to close the sale sooner and the interests of the objecting parties 
likely to succeed on appeal are sufficiently protected in the amount of time 
afforded.245 The court then balanced the interests of both parties and found that 
a reduced five-day stay would allow Borders to turn over its property to 
landlords and still give creditors sufficient notice to have their objections heard 
for sales of low-value assets.246 In other cases, courts have waived stays when 
there is evidence that a delay will cause the debtor to incur additional costs,247 
where the debtor had no more cash248 or the debtor had negative cash flow.249 
2. Appealing a Denial of a Motion for a Stay Pending Appeal 
An attempt to appeal the denial of a stay may come too late for relief to be 
possible. There are instances when a party did not obtain a stay pending appeal 
because of a procedural glitch: the party did not receive notice the order had 
been confirmed,250 the parties were in settlement negotiations,251 or the party 
learned of the sale too late and assumed seeking the stay pending appeal was 
futile.252 
 
 244 In re Borders Grp., Inc., 453 B.R. 477, 486 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2011) (citing 10 COLLIER, supra note 10, 
6004.0111 ). 
 245 Id. 
 246 Id. 
 247 Yamaha Motor Corp., USA v. Perry Hollow Mgmt. Co., Inc. (In re Perry Hollow Mgmt. Co., Inc.), 
297 F.3d 34, 41 (1st Cir. 2002). 
 248 Hower v. Molding Sys. Eng’g Corp., 445 F.3d 935, 938 (7th Cir. 2006). 
 249 In re Nature Leisure Times, LLC, No. 06-41357, 2007 WL 4554276, at *2–3 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. Dec. 
19, 2007). 
 250 Nordhoff Invs., Inc. v. Zenith Elecs. Corp., 258 F.3d 180, 187 (3d Cir. 2001). 
 251 E.g., Contrarian Funds LLC v. Aretex LLC (In re WestPoint Stevens, Inc.), 600 F.3d 231, 252–53 (2d 
Cir. 2010). 
 252 In re Tempo Tech. Corp., 202 B.R. 363, 365, 373–74 (D. Del. 1996) (appellants learned of the sale 
approval when the unsecured creditors’ committee formed, six days after the sale and transfer of assets 
occurred). However, ignorance of the law and the necessity for a stay after an expeditious proceeding is not an 
excuse for not obtaining a stay. Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors v. CIBC Woody Gundy Ventures (In 
re Temtechco, Inc., No. 95-00596, 1998 WL 887256 (Bankr. D. Del. Dec. 18, 1998) (quoting In re CGI 
Indus., Inc., 27 F.3d 296, 300 n.8 (7th Cir. 1994)). 
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As discussed above, each factor of consideration imposes a high standard 
for obtaining a stay pending appeal.253 Finalizing a sale quickly is in the 
interests of the buyer and the debtor. Yet, a party that fails to get a stay will 
have no further remedy. While most courts hold that an appeal absent a stay is 
moot, some courts provide more leeway for parties that unsuccessfully moved 
for a stay.254 Despite courts’ observation of a strict mootness rule, courts have 
recognized the harsh results that come from the denial of a stay: no opportunity 
for review.255 
3. Challenges to Good Faith 
Section 363(m) explicitly provides that its protections apply only to good 
faith purchasers.256 Today, most bankruptcy courts’ sale orders include an 
explicit finding of good faith, but rarely incorporate specific facts evidencing 
good faith in the sale order.257 In In re Abbott Dairies, the Third Circuit Court 
of Appeals rejected the notion that good faith was implicit in the bankruptcy 
judge’s approval; rather, protection under § 363(m) requires an explicit finding 
of good faith.258 
The standard for a finding of good faith is a lax one, deferential to the 
buyer unless there is egregious evidence to the contrary. As it is increasingly 
common for a creditor to be the buyer in § 363 sales, there is an imbalance of 
information in favor of the debtor and buyer (often the buyer-creditor).259 
Although a transaction between a creditor with leverage and a debtor is not 
 
 253 See supra Part I,C. 
 254 See, e.g., Deutsche Bank AG, London Branch v. Metromedia Fiber Network, Inc. (In re Metromedia 
Fiber Network, Inc.), 416 F.3d 136, 144–45 (2d Cir. 2005) (citing Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. LTV Steel Co. (In 
re Chateaugay Corp.), 94 F.3d 772, 776 (2d Cir. 1996)); Cartalemi v. Karta Corp. (In re Karta Corp.), 342 
B.R. 45, 52–53 (S.D.N.Y. 2006). 
 255 See e.g., Licensing by Paolo v. Sinatra (In re Gucci), 105 F. 3d 837, 840 (2d Cir. 1997) (“[A] district 
judge deciding whether to stay a bankruptcy sale pending appeal . . . should be aware that a closing occurring 
immediately after a stay is denied will substantially limit the scope of an appeal.” (emphasis omitted)). 
 256 11 U.S.C. § 363(m) (2006). 
 257 See generally General Order M-383, U.S. BANKR. COURT S. DIST. N.Y., http://www.nysb.uscourts. 
gov/orders/m383.pdf (last visited Nov. 4, 2012); Guidelines Re Sale Orders, U.S. BANKR. COURT N. DIST. 
CAL., http://www.canb.uscourts.gov/procedures/dist/guidelines/order-re-sale-orders (last visited Nov. 4, 2012); 
Bob Eisenbach, Delaware Bankruptcy Court Adopts New Local Rule for Section 363 Sales, IN THE (RED): THE 
BUSINESS BANKRUPTCY BLOG, http://bankruptcy.cooley.com/2008/02/articles/business-bankruptcy-issues/ 
delaware-bankruptcy-court-adopts-new-local-rule-for-section-363-sales/ (last visited Nov. 4, 2012); See also 
Bob Eisenbach, Have Section 363 Sale Orders Gone too Far?, IN THE (RED): THE BUSINESS BANKRUPTCY 
BLOG, http://bankruptcy.cooley.com/2007/08/articles/business-bankruptcy-issues/have-section-363-sale-
orders-gone-too-far/ (last visited Nov. 4, 2012) (comparing sale motions in major districts). 
 258 In re Abbotts Dairies of Pa., Inc., 788 F.2d 143, 149–50 (3d Cir. 1986). 
 259 Keach, supra note 47, at 60. 
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truly an arm’s length transaction,260 courts will generally make a finding of 
good faith unless there is “strong contrary evidence that the stalking horse 
lender has sought and obtained an unfair advantage over other bidders through 
the [creditor] or a manipulation of the approval process.”261 Since courts often 
authorize sales very soon after other creditors receive notice, it is unrealistic to 
assume an outsider would be able to find evidence of an insiders’ 
manipulation.262 
In theory, the burden of proving good faith falls upon its proponent;263 in 
practice, the party challenging good faith would need to controvert the 
evidence of good faith since the challenging party would unlikely have the 
knowledge or information to provide direct evidence of bad faith.264 In the 
short time frame before court authorization, it is unlikely a party would be able 
to make this showing. Many courts require a challenge to good faith be raised 
initially in the bankruptcy court or else the issue will also be moot on appeal.265 
Recognizing this difficulty, the Ninth Circuit permits remand for the sole 
purpose of determining good faith.266 
If a creditor unearths new information after a sale is complete, the creditor 
may have a remedy under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b), which allows 
relief from a final judgment.267 This rule can also be an avenue for review for a 
 
 260 An arm’s length transaction is “[a] transaction between two unrelated and unaffiliated parties” or a 
“transaction between two parties, however closely related they may be, conducted as if the parties were 
strangers, so that no conflict of interest arises.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1635 (9th ed. 2009). 
 261 Keach, supra note 47, at 60. 
 262 See LoPucki & Doherty, supra note 11, at 35 (stating it is naïve to expect a movant to bring forth 
evidence of a conflict of interest). 
 263 T.C. Investors v. Joseph (In re M Capital Corp.), 290 B.R. 743, 745 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2003). 
 264 See e.g., In re Tempo Tech. Corp., 202 B.R. 363, 369–70 (D. Del. 1996) (dismissing the challenge to 
good faith because there was no evidence or contravention of the only evidence of good faith: testimony of the 
debtor’s president); Roe & Skeel, supra note 29, at 745–46 (stating it is naïve to expect a movant to bring forth 
evidence of a conflict of interest). 
 265 Schum v. Zwirn Special Opportunities Fund LP (In re Watch Ltd.), 295 F. App’x 647, 650 (5th Cir. 
2008); Parker v. Goodman (In re Parker), 499 F.3d 616, 620 (6th Cir. 2007); Hazelbaker v. Hope Gas, Inc. (In 
re Rare Earth Minerals), 445 F.3d 359, 365 (4th Cir. 2006); Nieters v. Sevcik (In re Rodriquez), 258 F.3d 757, 
759 (8th Cir. 2001); In re Abbotts Dairies of Pa., Inc., 788 F.2d 143, 150–51 (3d Cir. 1986). 
 266 See e.g., Cmty. Thrift & Loan v. Suchy (In re Suchy), 786 F.2d 900, 902 (9th Cir. 1985) (finding that 
good faith and whether § 363 applies is the trial court’s domain); M Capital Corp., 290 B.R. at 748 (holding 
that there must be evidentiary findings of good faith beyond just boilerplate); Thomas v. Namba (In re 
Thomas), 278 B.R. 782, 785 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2002). Contra Watch Ltd., 257 Fed. App’x at 750 (citing Ginther 
v. Ginther Trusts (In re Ginther Trusts), 238 F.3d 686, 688–89 (5th Cir. 2001) (declining to examine facts not 
presented in the bankruptcy court)). 
 267 FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b)(2)–(3); see also Baldwin v. Credit Based Asset Servicing and Securitization, 516 
F.3d 734, 737–38 (8th Cir. 2008) (allowing the movant reasonable time to move for relief); Nanak Resorts, 
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party who received defective notice.268 Rule 9024 incorporates Federal Rule of 
Civil Procedure 60(b) into bankruptcy proceedings.269 Relief under this rule is 
extraordinary and rarely granted.270 But even here, some courts hold that the 
rule cannot trump § 363(m) and no relief is possible where the Code forecloses 
it.271 Regardless of what view courts take, the dueling policies of protecting 
creditor rights and the good faith purchaser collide. Even if the 60(b) motion is 
successful, there may be no relief available but to take to the property away 
from the good faith purchaser.272 
4. Creditor Protections and Due Process 
Due process ensures that creditors’ interests are not compromised. Ensuring 
these minimal protections need not be unreasonably prohibitive to the goals of 
reorganization. Courts can evaluate whether failings in procedure actually 
deprive creditors of rights or are mere technicalities. Unfortunately, this 
evaluation can pit a creditor’s small private interest against the public’s interest 
in reorganization. Nonetheless, even the smallest interests merit the 
fundamental protections of notice, an opportunity to be heard, and a chance to 
remedy a deprivation. 
 
Inc. v. Haskins Gas Serv., Inc. (In re Rome Family Corp.), No. 02-11771, 2010 WL 1381093, at *2 (Bankr. D. 
Vt. Mar. 31, 2010) (holding that egregious failure of key parties to fulfill statutory duties merited an 
extraordinary remedy); In re Aztec Supply Corp., 399 B.R. 480, 490 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2009) (same). 
 268 FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b)(4) (allows relief for when a judgment is void such as when a court lacks subject 
matter of jurisdiction). Reversal under this rule requires a “plain usurpation of power.” Hunter v. Underwood, 
362 F.3d 468, 475 (8th Cir. 2004) (citation omitted). 
 269 FED. R. BANKR. P. 9024; see also S. Motor Co. v. Carter-Pritchett-Hodges, Inc. (In re MMH Auto. 
Grp., LLC), 385 B.R. 347, 359 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2008) (outlining three approaches that courts take in response 
to defective notice). 
 270 Nanak Resorts, Inc. v. Haskins Gas Serv. (In re Rome Family Corp.), 407 B.R. 65, 80–81 (Bankr. D. 
Vt. 2009). 
 271 E.g., Contrarian Funds LLC v. Aretex LLC (In re WestPoint Stevens, Inc.), 600 F.3d 231, 250 (2d Cir. 
2010) (holding § 363(m) strips the court of jurisdiction altogether and it must protect the entire order from 
review, not just a part); In re Rickel & Assocs., Inc., 260 B.R. 673, 678 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2001) (“[T]he Rules 
cannot provide a remedy that the Bankruptcy Code has substantively foreclosed.” (quoting Branchburg Plaza 
Assocs., L.P. v. Fesq (In re Fesq) 153 F.3d 113, 116 (3d Cir. 1998))); see also Patrick M. Birneya, Bankruptcy 
Rule 9024: Paper Tiger or Powerful Procedural Tool When Stacked Against the Bankruptcy Code, 18 J. 
BANKR. L. & PRAC.,  Art. 4, available at Westlaw 18 J. Bankr. L. & Prac. 3 Art. 4 (arguing that the provisions 
of the Code should always trump the Rules). 
 272 See MMH Auto. Grp., 385 B.R. at 360–61. 
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a. Notice 
To satisfy the due process clause, notice must inform the individual of the 
impending hearing and provide time to prepare for it.273 Consistent with the 
flexibility throughout the Code, Rule 2002 provides for shortened notice, if 
circumstances merit it.274 Manufacturing an emergency situation, through a 
lack of due diligence or failure to plan ahead, is not itself justification for 
abridging the notice requirement.275 In Chrysler, the court held that publication 
in national newspapers was adequate notice, particularly since the case had 
been given so much public attention.276 In In re Haven Eldercare, the court 
shortened notice periods because the conditions met the “financial extremis” 
test—the value of assets was deteriorating the debtors were unable to find a 
cash purchaser at auction, and there was no credible evidence that additional 
notice would enhance the interests of any constituency.277 
Though all courts acknowledge that defective notice can invalidate a sale, 
they disagree on whether defective notice bars the operation of § 363(m).278 
Because the text of § 363(b) allows sales only “after notice and a hearing,”279 
some courts hold that inadequate notice invalidates a sale.280 These courts hold 
that an appellant may appeal even absent a stay pending appeal.281 Other courts 
 
 273 Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp. v. Ctr. Wholesale, Inc. (In re Ctr. Wholesale, Inc.), 759 F.2d 1440 
(9th Cir. 1985) (quoting Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1, 14 (1978)). 
 274 FED. R. BANKR. P. 2002(a)(2). 
 275 In re Fort Wayne Assoc., L.P., No. 97-10378, 1998 WL 928419, at *1 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. Dec. 16, 
1998); see also In re Amagansett Family Farm, Inc., No. 11-73929-AST, 2011 WL 5079493, at *5 (Bankr. 
E.D.N.Y. Oct. 25, 2011); In re Fields, No. 05-71190, 2007 WL 1549760, at *1 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. May 29, 
2007); In re Villareal, 160 B.R. 786, 787–88 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1993); In re Grant Broad. of Phila., Inc., 71 
B.R. 390, 397 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1987) (holding accommodating a witness is not sufficient reason to push up 
notice). 
 276 In re Chrysler LLC, 405 B.R. 84, 109 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009), aff’d sub nom. Ind. State Police 
Pension Trust v. Chrysler LLC (In re Chrysler LLC), 576 F.3d 108, 111 (2d Cir. 2009), aff’d 556 U.S. 960, 
960 (2009), vacated, 130 S. Ct. 1015 (2009), remanded, 592 F.3d 370 (2d Cir. 2010). 
 277 In re Haven Eldercare, LLC, 390 B.R. 762, 769, 770 (Bankr. D. Conn. 2008). But see In re Sandra 
Cotton, Inc., 65 B.R. 153, 156 (W.D.N.Y. 1986) (holding the bankruptcy judge overstepped judicial discretion 
because the circumstances did not meet “financial extremis”). 
 278 Howard J. Steinberg & Sean T. Torres, Consequences of Improper Notice, 1 BANKRUPTCY LITIGATION 
§ 3.47 (2011). 
 279 11 U.S.C. § 363(b)(1) (2006) reads: “The trustee, after notice and a hearing, may use, sell, or lease, 
other than in the ordinary course of business, property of the estate . . . .” 
 280 See e.g., In re Cavalieri, 142 B.R. 710, 720 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1992) (nulling the sale because lack of 
adequate notice violated 363(b) and Rule 2002(a)(2)). 
 281 In re Longoria, 400 B.R. 543, 552 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 2009); see, e.g., Citicorp Mortg. v. Brooks (In re 
Ex-Cel Concrete Co.), 178 B.R. 198, 205 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1995); IRS v. Moberg Trucking, Inc. (In re Moberg 
Trucking, Inc.), 112 B.R. 362, 363–64 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1990); see also Beneficial Cal., Inc. v. In re Villar (In 
re Villar), 317 B.R. 88, 94 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2004) (explaining that “the litigant attempting to effect service is 
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hold that although defective notice is cause to set aside a sale on appeal, it 
alone does not void a sale.282 These courts reason that the goals of finality and 
protecting good faith buyers should operate as under other circumstances.283 
Before voiding a sale, these courts assess the harm to the inadequately notified 
party against the finality interests of a good faith purchaser.284 These courts 
decline to void a sale if the objecting party had actual notice, but not formal 
notice, of the hearing.285  
For instance, in In re CLC Corp., an objecting party’s failure to inform the 
bankruptcy court of a transfer of interest, which resulted in the lack of formal 
compliance with notice requirements, was a technicality that should not 
invalidate the whole sale.286 In In re Edwards, the Seventh Circuit Court of 
Appeals dismissed an appeal as moot although the creditor never received 
formal notice before the sale because the objecting creditor neglected to take 
action for three and half months after receiving actual notice and eighteen 
months after the sale’s approval.287 The court reasoned that denial of due 
process, like any legal error, is waived if not timely raised.288 In In re Ex-Cel 
Concrete Co., the Ninth Circuit rejected the Edwards balancing approach in 
favor of stricter protection for due process rights.289 In this instance, the Ninth 
Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Court found that no notice was a jurisdictional 
defect and voided the sale.290  
 
responsible for proper service and bears the burden of proof”); Doolittle v. Santa Cruz (In re Metzger), 346 
B.R. 806, 816, 815 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 2006). 
 282 Gekas v. Pipin (In re Met-L-Wood Corp.), 861 F.2d 1012, 1018 (7th Cir. 1988); Knupfer v. HSA 
Residential Mortg. Servs., Inc. (In re Lau Capital Funding, Inc.), 321 B.R. at 295 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2005); 
Newman Grill Sys., LLC v. Ducane Gas Grills, Inc. (In re Ducane Gas Grills, Inc.), 320 B.R. 324, 332–33 
(Bankr. D.S.C. 2004). 
 283 Met-L-Wood Corp., 861 F.2d at 1018 (noting that § 363(m) does not apply because all parties in the 
case were guilty of fraud); Lau Capital Funding, 321 B.R. 287, 295 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2005) (holding that 
though defective notice may cause the sale to be voidable, it does not itself void contract entirely); In re 
Ducane Gas Grills, Inc., 320 B.R. at 332–33. 
 284 See In re F.A. Potts & Co., Inc., 86 B.R. 853, 861 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1988) (“The notice requirement is 
the fulcrum we use to balance a debtor’s title 11 protections against the Fifth Amendment guarantee that 
creditors will not be deprived of ‘life, liberty or property’ without ‘due process of the law.’”), aff’d sub nom. 
Appeal of Pagnotti Enterprises, Inc., 891 F.2d 282 (3d Cir. 1989). 
 285 LAWRENCE R. AHERN III & NANCY FRAAS MACLEAN, BANKR. PROC. MANUAL § 6004:1 (2011) (citing 
Wood v. CLC Corp. (In re CLC Corp.), 110 B.R. 335, 339 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1990)); see also S. Motor Co. 
v. Carter-Pritchett-Hodges, Inc. (In re MMH Auto Grp., LLC), 385 B.R. 347, 357–58 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2008). 
 286 Cf. CLC Corp., 110 B.R. at 340. 
 287 In re Edwards, 962 F.2d 641, 645 (7th Cir. 1991). 
 288 Id. at 644. 
 289 Citicorp Mortg. v. Brooks (In re Ex-Cel Concrete Co.), 178 B.R. 198, 204–05 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1995). 
 290 Id. at 205. 
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However, even the courts that take a harder line on voiding sales recognize 
that if relief can be granted without rescinding a sale, the court should do so. In 
In re Center Wholesale, the court acknowledged that the one-day’s notice the 
creditor received was inadequate, so it sought a compromise that would protect 
the creditor’s rights without reversing the sale to the good faith buyer.291 The 
court remanded the case to the bankruptcy court and suggested the 
inadequately notified party be placed in the position it occupied before the 
sale.292 
5. Manufacturing an Emergency 
Deference to a debtor in assessing the need for urgent action leaves the 
court vulnerable to a contrived emergency to appease an impatient buyer or 
circumvent procedural norms. The Code recognizes that more fair and efficient 
outcomes result from a rigid procedure that allows for timely deliberation and 
distributions, rather than a race among creditors for the debtor’s property. Rule 
6003 aimed to prevent certain creditors from getting an advantage by rushing 
to court for the best treatment.293 While a quick resolution may have a better 
outcome for an individual creditor, expediting these deliberations should not 
come at the expense of other creditors’ rights.294 
a. First-Day Orders 
First-day orders, or those entered the first day after filing a petition,295 are 
problematic because of their ability to circumvent the reorganization process 
before assessing whether appointment of creditor committees is appropriate.296 
Recognizing the disruption to the orderly procedure of bankruptcy that comes 
from a rush to the courthouse for first-day orders, the Rules Committee added 
Rule 6003 in 2008.297 Rule 6003 prohibits relief within the first twenty-one 
 
 291 Owens-Corning Fiberglass, Inc. v. Ctr. Wholesale, Inc. (In re Ctr. Wholesale, Inc.), 759 F.2d 1440, 
1149–50 (9th Cir. 1985). 
 292 Id. at 1451 (suggesting that this could be achieved by granting Owens-Corning super-priority under 
§ 507(b)). 
 293 See infra Part II.D.5.a. 
 294 See Bussel & Klee, supra note 37, at 738. 
 295 See generally Steven N. Cousins, et al., First Day Orders: An Examination, 11 J. BANKR. L. & PRAC. 
213, 213 (2002). 
 296 ADVISORY COMM. ON BANKR. RULES, MEETING OF OCTOBER 2–3, 2008 147–48 (2008), available at 
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Agenda%20Books/Bankruptcy/BK2008-10.pdf. 
 297 See FED. R. BANKR. P. 6003 advisory committee notes. 
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days of petition unless there would be irreparable harm without action.298 In 
essence, Rule 6003 acts as a speed bump, providing more time to all parties 
and the court to consider to fundamental matters of the case.299 
If “irreparable harm” would result absent immediate action, Rule 6003 has 
an exception to the mandatory waiting period,300 but since debtors use § 363 
sales for their speed, evidence that denying a sale would have any negative 
effect on the debtor could suffice for a showing of irreparable harm. Like the 
valid business purpose test, the irreparable harm standard forces the court to 
defer to the debtor’s management on the urgent necessity of the sale.301 Thus, 
the debtor’s portrayal of the situation colors both a court’s authorization of the 
sale and its willingness to expedite creditors’ rights to avoid irreparable harm. 
But, it is extremely rare for a business scenario to truly necessitate a sale 
within twenty-one days.302 Irreparable harm requires a showing that the 
movant will suffer “actual and imminent” harm, not just “speculative or 
unsubstantiated” harm.303 A narrower interpretation of “irreparable harm,” 
which imports an analysis similar to the doctrine of necessity, would limit its 
application to rare and exceptional circumstances with veritable imminent 
harm.304 
 
 298 Id. 6003. Prior to the enactment of Rule 6003, it was not uncommon for a large volume of documents 
filed in the first days of a case. ADVISORY COMM. ON BANKR. RULES, supra note 296. 
 299 See FED. R. BANKR. P. 6003 advisory committee notes (2007 Adoption). Part of the impetus for time to 
consider was to reduce the instance of forum shopping for courts more willing to grant relief immediately. 
Memorandum from Bankruptcy Judges Advisory Group on Rule 6003, to Bankruptcy Rules Advisory 
Committee (Aug. 24, 2008), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/BK%20 
Suggestions%202008/08-BK-D-Suggestion-Bankruptcy%20Rules%20Advisory%20Committee.pdf. 
 300 FED. R. BANKR. P. 6003. 
 301 When applying the irreparable harm standard to critical vendor payments, courts generally approve 
them so long as the debtor can show that a vendor has threatened to cut off post-petition goods or services if 
not paid; the vendor cannot be easily replaced; and that such a creditor requires payment for prepetition 
services before postpetition performance will be granted. In re Kmart Corp., 359 F.3d 866, 872–73 (7th Cir. 
2004). 
 302 10 COLLIER, supra note 10, ¶ 6003.0102[3][b]. But see Bay Harbour Mgmt., L.C. v. Lehman Bros. 
Holdings, Inc. (In re Lehman Bros. Holdings, Inc.), 415 B.R. 77, 80–81 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (finding an 
extraordinary emergency); In re Bombay Co., No. 07-44084-RFN-11, 2007 WL 2826071, at *3–4 (Bankr. 
N.D. Tex. Sept. 26, 2007) (same). 
 303 Abney v. Amgen, Inc., 443 F.3d 540, 552 (6th Cir. 2006) (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
 304 Andy Vara, The Impact of BAPCA and Rule Changes in Chapter 11 Cases, in 16TH ANNUAL CENTRAL 
STATES BANKRUPTCY WORKSHOP, TRAVERSE CITY, MI. JUNE 11–14, 2009, available at Westlaw, 061109 
ABI-CLE 359; Matthew T. Gensburg, et al., Business Practitioners: Life under BAPCPA—The Impact of 
BAPCPA and Rule Changes in Chapter 11 Cases, in 16TH ANNUAL CENTRAL STATES BANKRUPTCY 
WORKSHOP, supra at *2. 
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The doctrine of necessity is an equitable doctrine that allows immediate 
relief—the minimum necessary to maintain the debtor’s existence.305 Prior to 
the enactment of Rule 6003, it governed consideration of first-day orders by 
limiting such orders to those that would not violate or disregard anyone’s 
substantive rights in ways not authorized by the Code.306 The doctrine of 
necessity balances two prongs: the reorganization of viable entities and the 
equal treatment of all creditors.307 Some remedies that allow for payment of 
prepetition creditors defy equal treatment, but may be indispensable to 
reorganization, such as a critical vendor.308 
b. Demonstrating Irreparable Harm 
The irreparable harm standard can be abused as a tool of appeasement of 
creditors or potential buyers.309 When a debtor delays filing bankruptcy despite 
knowledge of the pending situation to compel an urgent sale, it deprives 
creditors of the opportunity to receive adequate notice.310 In In re Adamson, 
the court found that the debtor’s delay to file its bankruptcy petition despite 
prior knowledge of the need for long-term financing was bad faith.311 The 
Adamson court analogized the request for emergency relief to the request for a 
temporary restraining order under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.312 The 
court said notice requirements for first-day orders, which grant a going-
forward change, should be at least as burdensome for fundamental bankruptcy 
matters as it is for temporary restraining orders, which preserve the status 
quo.313 The debtor should not be able to circumvent this burden by delaying to 
file a petition.314 
 
 305 10 COLLIER, supra note 10, ¶ 6003.01[1][b]; see also Kmart Corp., 359 F.3d at 871 (“A doctrine of 
necessity’ is just a fancy name for a power to depart from the Code.”). 
 306 10 COLLIER, supra note 10, ¶ 6003.01[1][b] n.20 (citing In re Colad Grp., Inc., 324 B.R. 208, 213–14 
(Bankr. W.D.N.Y 2005)). 
 307 In re United Am., Inc., 327 B.R. 776, 781 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2005). 
 308  Id. at 781–82 (explaining that for a vendor to receive critical vendor status, the payment must be in the 
best interest of the debtors and other creditors; the transaction must be in sound business judgment; and not 
prejudice other creditors). 
 309 Id. at 782. 
 310 In re Adamson Co., Inc., 29 B.R. 937, 941 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1983). 
 311 Id. 
 312 Id. at 940–41. Rule 65(b) allows a temporary restraining order without written or oral notice only if 
immediate and irreparable injury, loss or damage will occur before notice can be served and the movant’s 
attorney certifies in writing the efforts, if any, which have been made to provide parties in interest adequate 
notice. 
 313 Id. at 941. 
 314 Id. 
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The problem with the melting ice cube justification is that the debtor can 
easily unplug the freezer.315 In In re Humboldt Creamery LLC, the court 
reluctantly approved a sale, but explained that the modern trend of debtors 
waiting until there is no ability to survive in chapter 11 strips the bankruptcy 
judge of meaningful discretion, since the judge must decide between rubber 
stamping a sale or rejecting the sale and allowing the debtor to fail.316 The 
court explained that only a judge with exceptional courage would reject such a 
sale.317 If a court believes the DIP contrived the emergency, it could refuse to 
make a finding of good faith, thereby preventing the rushed sale from being 
protected by mootness.318 However, rescinding mootness would still cause the 
same problem as disapproving a sale outright: the threat of compromising the 
reorganization or discouraging future buyers.319 
III.  BALANCING INTERESTS: DUE PROCESS & FINALITY 
A. Flexible Due Process 
Bankruptcy courts reasonably apply procedural due process as a flexible 
concept to protect rights without undermining the equitable goals of the 
court.320 Procedural due process requires a reasonable opportunity to be heard 
and notice that is reasonably calculated.321 Section 102(1) encapsulates the 
fundamental notions of procedural due process in bankruptcy proceedings.322 
In Mathews v. Eldridge, the Supreme Court presented a utilitarian calculus for 
considering how far the flexibility of due process can extend.323 This calculus 
includes three factors: private interests, the risk of an erroneous deprivation, 
 
 315 In re Humboldt Creamery, LLC, No. 09-11078, 2009 WL 2820610, at *2 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. Aug. 14, 
2009). 
 316 Id. (“While nominally ‘presiding’ over the case, the judge is reduced to a figurehead without any 
meaningful discretion and might as well leave his or her signature stamp with the debtor’s counsel and go on 
vacation or shift attention to consumer cases where the law may still mean something.”). 
 317 Id. 
 318 In re Bombay Co., No. 07-44084-RFN-11, 2007 WL 2826071, at *3 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. Sept. 26, 
2007). 
 319 Id. at *3–4 (declining to assign responsibility for the contrived time trap, despite noting evidence of the 
time trap); In re Tempo Tech. Corp., 202 B.R. 363, 367–70 (D. Del. 1996) (rejecting allegations that debtor 
waited to complete negotiations with the buyer before filing bankruptcy). 
 320 Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972) (“[D]ue process is flexible and calls for such 
procedural protections as the particular situation demands.”). 
 321 Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950). 
 322 See Owens-Corning Fiberglass, Inc., v. Ctr. Wholesale, Inc. (In re Ctr. Wholesale, Inc.), 759 F.2d 
1440, 1449 (9th Cir. 1985). 
 323 See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 88, at 583 (discussing Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976)). 
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and the government’s interest.324 For § 363 sales, the private interests are the 
property rights of creditors. Property considerations are tempered by the 
incremental increase in creditors’ rights from the creation of more procedural 
hurdles to § 363 sales. These private interests are weighed against the 
government’s interest in the program.325 Procedural due process is commonly 
litigated within the context of administration of government programs, but 
here, the government’s function is less direct: facilitating the reorganization of 
distressed companies through the Code. 
Few bankruptcy courts explicitly import the Mathews utilitarian calculus, 
but the case shaped the jurisprudence of procedural due process.326 The 
Northern District of Texas Court explicitly applied the analysis in In re Texas 
Extrusion Corp.327 The court defined the private interest as the appellant’s 
equity interest in the bankruptcy estate, or her husband’s property.328 The court 
reasoned that since the estate was community property, the appellant received 
constructive notice through her husband and additional notice to her directly 
would not have mitigated the chance or erroneous deprivation.329 Because the 
interest in finality outweighed the minimal benefits of a finding of inadequate 
notice, the court held that there was no violation of the appellants’ due process 
rights.330 Thus, the court held the equitable interests of third parties outweighed 
the appellant’s harm from a technicality, not truly inadequate notice.331 In 
Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust, the Supreme Court endorsed such a 
practical view of due process, declaring personal service of written notice to 
unknown parties would be an unjustified obstacle.332 Consideration of the 
rights of all parties need not lead to unreasonable results.333 
 
 324 Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335. 
 325 Id. 
 326 The case is commonly cited by courts for its holding that the “opportunity to be heard at a meaningful 
time and in a meaningful manner.” Id. at 333; see also CHEMERINSKY, supra note 88, at 335. 
 327 Tex. Extrusion Corp. v. Palmer, Palmer & Coffee (In re Tex. Extrusion Corp.), 68 B.R. 712, 726 (N.D. 
Tex. 1986), aff’d, 836 F.2d 217 (5th Cir. 1988), aff’d sub nom. Tex. Extrusion Corp. v. Lockheed Corp. (In re 
Tex. Extrusion Corp.), 844 F.2d 1142 (5th Cir. 1988). 
 328 Id. 
 329 Id. 
 330 Id. at 727. 
 331 Id. at 726. 
 332 Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313–14 (1950). 
 333 GMAC Mortg. Corp. v. Salisbury (In re Loloee), 241 B.R. 655, 661–62 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1999) 
(explaining that court must evaluate the difference between the notice that was given and what should have 
been given if the Rules were followed to determine whether it flunks “due process”). 
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The expedited process of § 363 sales coupled with the mootness protection 
offers sophisticated debtors and buyers a mechanism to circumvent the rights 
of other parties-in-interest.334 Congress recognized the tendency of debtors to 
pacify large creditors, who hold leverage in the future reorganized debtor, at 
the expense of small and scattered parties-in-interest.335 Unlike other areas of 
law,336 bankruptcy precludes post-deprivation relief because of the inability to 
undo a transaction.337 Thus, few remedies can be preserved that would not 
disrupt the reorganization goals of the bankruptcy courts. Even if sale 
authorization hearings occur, their pace can prevent creditors from putting 
forth a meaningful objection.338 Courts are generally deferential to debtors 
because of the aim to facilitate successful reorganizations,339 but the need for a 
speedy reorganization should not outweigh assurance that due process rights 
are preserved.340 
In the Borders bankruptcy, the court recognized the importance of due 
process rights even for small transactions.341 The judge sua sponte modified 
the sale procedures because they violated creditors’ due process rights.342 The 
debtor requested the court order a forward-looking finding of good faith, but 
the court refused and instead required affirmative evidence of good faith for 
any particular sale.343 The court also rejected the proposal that there would be 
no notice on sales of assets worth under $300,000 and only five-days’ notice 
for sales under $1 million.344 
In some instances, creditors are sophisticated enough to formulate their 
own objections to protect their due process rights. In other instances, the court 
 
 334 See LOPUCKI, supra note 30, at 167–69 (arguing that some approved sales are doubtfully even legal). 
 335 S. REP. No. 95-989, at 10 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5796. 
 336 E.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 260–66 (1970) (discussing the possibility of post-deprivation 
relief in the cessation of welfare benefits and contrasting with other interests). 
 337 Lindsey Freeman, Comment, BAPCPA and Bankruptcy Direct Appeals: The Impact of Procedural 
Uncertainty of Predictable Precedent, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 543, 571 (2011). 
 338 See LoPucki & Doherty, supra note 11, at 40. 
 339 In re GSC, Inc., 453 B.R. 132, 174 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2011) (“Courts give deference to the debtor as 
long as there is a ‘reasonable basis for its business decision.’”); see also LoPucki & Doherty, supra note 11, at 
40 (stating that as of the time of publication, there was no modern case where a large public company 
proposed a sale and the courts refused to approve it). 
 340 Citicorp Mortg., Inc. v. Brooks (In re Ex-Cel Concrete Co.), 178 B.R. 198, 205 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1995) 
(stating that the exigency and equitable aims of the bankruptcy code do not justify departures from due 
process). 
 341 In re Borders Grp., Inc., 453 B.R. 477, 483–84 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y 2011). 
 342 Id. 
 343 Id. at 484–85. 
 344 Id. at 483. 
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will raise notice issues on its own recognizing unfair treatment of small 
creditors, as the Borders court did. The debtor’s proposal in Borders would 
have eliminated any meaningful opportunity to object.345 Notice and 
opportunity to be heard is a hallmark of due process rights, but given that 
§ 363(m) bars any appeal after sale authorization, a creditor stripped of notice 
and an opportunity to be heard effectively has no rights or remedies 
whatsoever. 
B. Recommendations 
Because of the desire to protect good faith purchasers, getting an appeal is 
very challenging. Recognizing this, courts should endeavor to avoid appealable 
issues arising. Courts should adopt an approach to § 363 sales that balances the 
interests of protecting creditor rights without sacrificing the most attractive 
aspects of bankruptcy—flexibility and finality.346 As discussed, such balancing 
need not sacrifice effective reorganizations for technicalities.347 Rather, it 
would weigh the incremental benefits to the creditor from the added protection 
against the detriment to the reorganization. This approach should recognize 
that a slightly less than optimal solution for the debtor could be justified by the 
benefits of ensuring procedural safeguards. After sale authorization, stays 
pending appeal should not be virtually unattainable remedies. If they are not 
obtained though, courts should adopt the more equitable approach of 
recognizing an exception to § 363(m), which grants relief when it is possible 
without undermining finality before mooting an appeal. 
1. Protecting from Powerful Creditors 
A debtor who files for bankruptcy is desperate to reorganize as quickly and 
efficiently as possible. When a buyer steps in willing to finance a 
reorganization through the purchase of assets, that buyer has the debtor at its 
mercy.348 Buyers always have an incentive to get a sale done as quickly as 
possible, particularly when that sale bears no risk of future litigation.349 The 
fact that a buyer wants a quick sale does not mean the debtor and the court 
 
 345 Cf. id. at 484. (rejecting the movants’ assertion that good faith be presumed). 
 346 See supra Part I.A.3. 
 347 See supra text accompanying notes 329–33. 
 348 See Frost, supra note 65, at 128–29; Charles Jordan Tabb, Emergency Preferential Orders in 
Bankruptcy Reorganizations, 65 AM. BANKR. L.J. 75, 79 (1991). 
 349 See supra Part II.A.2. 
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must comply;350 the court’s role should be to protect the desperate debtor from 
agreeing to conditions compelled out of duress, particularly when those 
conditions sacrifice the rights of other creditors.351 
The court, like the debtor, is captive to the parties in interest, particularly 
since management involved with the daily operations of the business can best 
assess the urgent status of a proposed sale.352 Courts import the business 
judgment rule to give the debtors great deference and are reluctant to scrutinize 
the proposed sales absent objections.353 A willing buyer may offer too 
attractive an opportunity to give up because of a few offending points.354 The 
bankruptcy court’s dilemma is whether to grant the order despite possible 
problems or risk a failed reorganization; the short time to make the decision 
exacerbates the problem.355 
If courts import the business judgment rule from corporate law, they should 
also import the increased skepticism of sales involving self-interested 
transactions. When a sale is conducted, courts should seek proof that the debtor 
carefully considered all its options, that an approved buyer is the highest 
bidder, and that the auction procedures allowed fair solicitation of all bids. 
Under Delaware corporate law, when a company is up for sale, courts apply 
the Revlon doctrine, which shifts management’s fiduciary duties from the 
corporation to obtaining the highest bid for shareholders.356 The doctrine 
ensures a true market test that leaves no doubt as to the value of the 
company.357 Because one of the primary justifications for market sales is their 
ability to provide a more accurate valuation than the court could give on its 
 
 350 Adler, supra note 29, at 308. 
 351 In re Cloverleaf Enters., Inc., No. 09-20056, 2010 WL 1445487, at *2–3 (Bankr. D. Md. Apr. 2, 2010). 
 352 Miller & Waisman, supra note 46, at 154–55. 
 353 J. Seth Moore & Vincent P. Slusher, Bankruptcy Code Section 363 Sales: Trends and Opportunities, 
2007 NORTON BANKR. L. ADVISER 2, Sept. 2007, at *6, 8, available at Westlaw, 2007 No. 9 Norton Bankr. L. 
Adviser 2 (citing Summit Land Co. v. Allen (In re Summit Land Co.), 13 B.R. 310, 315 (Bankr. D. Utah 
1981)). 
 354 Roe & Skeel, supra note 29, at 736. 
 355 See generally Tabb, supra note 29 (discussing this overarching dilemma when considering emergency 
orders). 
 356 Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 184 (Del. 1986); Paramount 
Comm. v. QVC Network, 637 A.2d 34 (Del.1994); see also In re PWS Holding Corp., 228 F.3d 224, 247 (3d 
Cir. 2000) (declining to address whether Revlon duties are imposed in bankruptcy to fully market assets 
because they would not be relevant in the situation); In re Bidermann Indus. U.S.A., Inc., 203 B.R. 547, 551 
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1997) (confirming the consensus that fiduciary duties applicable in corporate law continue to 
operate in chapter 11 cases). 
 357 Adler, supra note 29, at 316. 
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own,358 expedited sales should have a similar standard. Creditors’ interests, just 
like shareholders’ interests, should not be auctioned off in a fire sale, but 
should be carefully marketed to ensure they receive the highest bid for their 
property. Courts can require that a § 363 motion include a disclosure of the 
kind of sales processes undertaken and the reason the choice was made.359 As 
in corporate law,360 bankruptcy does not require the debtor accept the highest 
bid, but the best bid, so long as there is a legitimate business reason that makes 
that bid better than the highest bid.361 However, a legitimate business reason 
should be assessed in light of not just management’s best interest, but also the 
creditors’ best interest.362 
When a sale involves a powerful creditor, the court should exercise 
heightened scrutiny of that creditor’s influence upon the debtor and how 
proposed actions impact minority creditors. The significant deference afforded 
to debtors in such circumstances is not justified, particularly because a debtors’ 
management does not have the same incentives as a solvent company.363 In 
bankruptcy, management’s fiduciary duties shift from the corporation to the 
creditors.364 Under the Code, a party may qualify as an “insider,” if it is 
functionally equivalent to one of the enumerated definitions in § 101(31)(B) 
and has the ability to coerce the debtor’s actions.365 Because a powerful 
 
 358 In re Gulf Coast Oil Corp., 404 B.R. 407, 424 (S.D. Tex. 2009) (“The principal justification for 
§ 363(b) sales is that aggressive marketing in an active market assures that the estate will receive maximum 
benefit.”). But see Robert E. Steinberg, The Seven Deadly Sins in § 363 Sales, AM. BANKR. INST. J., June 2005, 
at 22 (“[T]he § 363 sale process fails to maximize value because debtor management is not able to lead the 
process properly or does not recognize, due to inexperience with the process, the many pitfalls and 
obstacles . . . .”). 
 359 See e.g., In re GSC, Inc., 453 B.R. 132, 169 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2011); In re Integrated Res., Inc. 135 
B.R. 746, 750 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y 1992); In re Fin. News Network, Inc., 126 B.R. 152, 157 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 
1991). 
 360 Barkan v. Amsted Indus., Inc., 527 A.2d 1279 (Del. 1989) (holding that there is no set method of 
fulfilling Revlon duties). 
 361 See supra Part I.A.3. 
 362 In re Cloverleaf Enters., Inc., No. 09-20056, 2010 WL 1445487, at *2–3 (Bankr. D. Md. Apr. 2, 2010). 
 363 See discussion supra Part II.B. 
 364 The breadth of this shift of duties varies based on the state corporate law. See generally Laura Lin, 
Shift of Fiduciary Duty upon Corporate Insolvency: Proper Scope of Directors’ Duty to Creditors, 46 VAND. 
L. REV. 1485, 1512 (1993); see also Prod. Res. Grp., LLC v. NCT Grp., Inc., 863 A.2d 772, 789–90 (Del. Ch. 
2004) (disagreeing with the contention that there is a shift of duties from shareholders to creditors, but 
reasoning instead that when companies are in the “zone of insolvency,” duties persist both constituencies). 
Creditors do not have a direct claim for breach of fiduciary duty against directors. Mukamal v. Bakes, 378 F. 
App’x 890, 898 (11th Cir. 2010) (interpreting N. Am. Catholic Educ. Programming Found., Inc. v. Gheewalla, 
930 A.2d 92, 94 (Del. 2007)). 
 365 Schubert v. Lucent Techs., Inc. (In re Winstar Commc’ns), 554 F.3d 382, 396–97 (3d Cir. 2009) 
(discussing the existence of non-statutory insiders who exert the equivalent control of statutory insiders). 
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creditor-buyer can coerce the debtor, such sales merit heightened scrutiny. A 
court should at least be satisfied that such a transaction is a bona fide arm’s 
length transaction rather than a transaction driven by factors other than 
fiduciary duties.366 
When a sale is to be completed quickly, rather than inferring from the lack 
of objections that the sale should go ahead, the court should make affirmative 
findings that the sale is fair to creditors. If a creditor’s time to object is limited, 
a sale could be moot before a creditor even discovers the problem. To 
compensate for the condensed time in which creditors may not have an 
opportunity to formulate meaningful objections, a court should exercise its 
judgment to ensure that creditors are not being unfairly treated.367 
The court should also require concrete evidence not just that a sale is 
necessary, but also that it must be done within the short time frame requested. 
Exigency alone is not sufficient to show why a sale must be done in a given 
short time frame. A second best alternative, which ensures creditor rights, may 
be preferable. For example, in GSC, the court held that even though the buyer 
would not walk away from the sale, the potential for a lower price was enough 
to justify accommodating the buyer’s demands.368 Here, the court capitulated 
to an unhappy buyer, despite acknowledging the reorganization could survive 
without doing so. Instead, courts should not circumvent creditor protections, 
but rely on the debtor and buyer to work out the creditor’s objection without 
sacrificing the highest bid, since eliciting the highest price is in the interest of 
all parties.369 
2. Providing an Opportunity for Review 
Enforcing the fourteen-day stay provision of Rule 6004(h) will also prevent 
buyers from exerting pressure to get a deal done faster. A mandatory cushion 
removes the incentive for a buyer to push the debtor for an immediate sale, 
 
 366 In re Tidal Const. Co., Inc., 446 B.R. 620, 624 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 2009) (citing In re Gen. Bearing 
Corp., 136 B.R. 361 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1992)); see also In re Borders Grp., Inc., 453 B.R. 477, 484–85 (Bankr. 
S.D.N.Y. 2011) (explaining a purchaser’s lack of connections with the debtor is an indication of good faith). 
 367 See e.g., In re Naron & Wagner, Chartered, 88 B.R. 85, 89 (Bankr. D. Md. 1988) (ordering a second 
round of notice statements, which minimally adequately notified creditors, in lieu of chapter 11 organization 
disclosure); see also In re Bombay Co., No. 07-44084-RFN-11, 2007 WL 2826071, at *4 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 
Sept. 26, 2007) (noting that even though there were some objectors, the court was not satisfied that all 
potential objectors had the opportunity to voice their objections). 
 368 Supra Part II.A.2. 
 369 Courts in bankruptcy often defer to parties to work out conflicts, but in this situation courts may need 
to intervene to ensure there are not persistent hold out problems. 
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which would eliminate the possibility of appellate review.370 A statutory 
waiting period would take it out of the debtor’s hands as a negotiating point. 
This stay coupled with the mandatory twenty-one days’ notice will give a 
creditor more time to formulate an objection. Only in the exceptional case 
should notice be abbreviated to less than twenty-one days and to less than all 
creditors. The approval provisions for notice should ensure that all creditors 
are receiving not only adequate information, but also within a reasonably 
advanced period to prepare meaningful objections. 
An explicit standard requiring a minimum showing that a fourteen-day stay 
is unduly burdensome for the debtor’s reorganization would help guarantee 
more time for creditors to formulate objections. The mere desire of a purchaser 
to get a sale done quickly does not justify depriving a creditor of time to 
consider the ramifications of a sale and possible objections. 
Once a sale order is approved, courts should be very willing to grant a stay 
pending appeal, unless the grounds for appeal are unfounded. Once a court 
denies a stay and a sale consummates, the potential appellant with a 
meritorious claim is irreparably harmed.371 The irreparable harm standard 
should apply consistently for creditors and debtor movants: if courts accept the 
debtors speculative arguments of harm to the company by not completing a 
sale immediately, a creditor’s concrete harm of not being able to undo a sale 
should receive equal weight, as the court in Adelphia recognized.372 
Consideration of a stay must consider this threat foremost rather than circularly 
focusing on whether the already court-authorized sale is immediately necessary 
for reorganization. If a bankruptcy court denies a stay pending appeal, a party 
may attempt an expedited appeal of the denial.373 Making this form of review 
more readily available allows a different court to review whether the 
bankruptcy court’s deference to the debtor was excessive and whether the 
creditor’s objections merit review. 
The speculative harm of the bidder paying a lower price after waiting for an 
appeal would be mitigated by the appellant’s willingness to post a bond. 
 
 370 Kuney, supra note 107, at 271; see also Bruce H. White & William L. Medford, Equitable Mootness 
and Substantial Consummation: Are You Losing Your Appeal?, AM. BANKR. INST. J., Feb. 2001, at 26, 26–27. 
 371 See supra Part I.C. 
 372 See supra notes 120–22 and accompanying text. 
 373 FED. R. BANKR. P. 8011. Chrysler was an example of stay denial that was emergency appealed to the 
court of appeals; see also In re Boscov’s, Inc., No. 08-11637 (KG), 2008 WL 4975882 (Bankr. D. Del. Nov. 
21, 2008). 
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Payment of the bond indemnifies the party whose action the stay pending 
appeal halts, in the event the appealing party does not prevail.374 This 
requirement limits the parties who would seek stays to those confident their 
appeal has merit and that they would not lose money on the appeal.375 
3. Equitably Interpreting Mootness 
Section 363(m) should not serve to moot all unstayed appeals. Courts, 
uncomfortable with such a harsh result, have carved out an array of narrow 
exceptions.376 Ultimately, courts have incorporated the principles of equitable 
mootness to interpret the statutory mootness provision. The speed of the § 363 
sales makes them more vulnerable to abuses and unfairness than a 
reorganization plan.377 This should make the sales more, not less, prone to 
review and the consideration of whether fair remedies are available. At the 
least, the doctrine of equitable mootness should explicitly apply to both 
reorganization plans and the sales, which are increasingly replacing plans. 
While the application of the doctrine is not entirely predictable the way a per 
se rule is, it does operate effectively in reorganization plans to preserve finality 
without condoning potentially grave injustices to creditors. 
A narrower interpretation of § 363(m) could decrease the use of § 363 
sales, since statutory mootness is a benefit of § 363 sales. However, an 
expedited process creates myriad windows for abuse. If debtors have a real 
choice between using a process that limits the protections for creditors versus a 
reorganization plan, a preference for plans with full creditor protections is 
desirable.378 The doctrine of necessity is not for routine use, but rather an 
alternative in an emergency.379 The threat of contrived emergencies exists; 
 
 374 FED. R. BANKR. P. 8005.  
 375 Kuney, supra note 107. FED. R. BANKR. P. 7062 incorporates FED. R. CIV. P. 62(d), which does not 
specify how to calculate a bond amount, but courts have read in the requirements of its predecessor, as some 
proportion of the judgment remaining unsatisfied. Poplar Grove Planting & Refining Co. v. Bache Halsey 
Stuart, Inc., 600 F.2d 1189, 1191 (5th Cir. 1979). 
 376 Supra Part II.C.2. 
 377 In re Gulf Coast Oil Corp., 404 B.R. 407, 423–24 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2009). 
 378 E.g., In re Bombay Co., No. 07-44084-RFN-11, 2007 WL 2826071, at *3 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. Sept. 26, 
2007) (stating its preference for plans to § 363 sales). However, there is no clear evidence that decreasing the 
breadth of mootness will dissuade debtors from using this option. See Part II.C.2–3. 
 379 In re CoServ, LLC, 273 B.R. 487, 491 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2002) (explaining doctrine of necessity is to 
be used only in rare cases); Official Asbestos Claimants’ Comm. v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., (In re Babcock & 
Wilcox Co.), 274 B.R. 230, 256 n.208 (Bankr. E.D. La. 2002) (same); In re C.A.F. Bindery, 199 B.R. 828, 
835–36 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1996) (mentioning doctrine receives limited application); Joseph Gilday, “Critical” 
Error: Why Essential Vendor Payments Violate the Bankruptcy Code, 11 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 411, 432 
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buyers seeking the protections of no possibility of appeal should be treated as 
suspect.380 Thus, limiting mootness, and the potential for its abuse, is 
appropriate. Courts should demonstrate a willingness to consider equitable 
considerations for statutory mootness in a similar fashion to all other 
bankruptcy matters, so that incentives for expedition to cloak abuse in 
mootness do not exist. Additionally, courts should always allow appeals on the 
issue of good faith, since the lack thereof fails to comply with the good faith 
purchaser requirement of § 363(m).381 Not allowing such appeals does not 
further the interest of finality, but creates a perverse incentive for buyers. 
The Supreme Court has reiterated that “[t]he need for expedition, however, 
is not a justification for abandoning proper standards.”382 The proper standards 
and protections throughout chapter 11 should apply to § 363 sales, even where 
the justification for an emergency sale exist. 
CONCLUSION 
Section 363 sales are an important tool in bankruptcy. The public has an 
interest in concluding bankruptcies quickly and efficiently.383 But, efficiency 
comes at a price: a less thorough process, creating vulnerabilities to creditors’ 
rights. A long appeals process does not serve the interests of efficiency. Like 
all due process, there must be a balance between protecting the most sacrosanct 
of procedural rights (a fair chance to protect one’s property and the right to 
appeal an unjust verdict) and what is reasonable under the circumstances. Any 
solution to a problem in bankruptcy must evaluate not only the interests of the 
debtor (and future debtors) in a vacuum, but also the creditor’s potential 
deprivation of property and the subsequent loss of review on appeal.384 
Congress included § 363 in recognition of the fact that reorganization plans are 
not always practical; nonetheless, there should be a greater onus on the party 
 
(2003) (citing In re Chandlier, 292 B.R. 583, 588 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 2003) (stating the doctrine of necessity 
allows payment in chapter 11 case under very extraordinary circumstances)). 
 380 Cf. Craig A. Sloane, supra note 14, at 60 (citing In re Public Serv. Co., 90 B.R. 575, 581–82 n.7 
(Bankr. D.N.H. 1988)) (“Congress could not have intended for the extensive disclosure requirements under 
§ 1125 to be superseded by mere notice and the remaining chapter 11 protections reduced to the ‘business 
justification’ test.”). 
 381 See supra Part II.D.3. 
 382 Protective Comm. for Indep. Stockholders of TMT Trailer Ferry, Inc. v. Anderson, 390 U.S. 414, 450 
(1968); see also Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594, 2620 (2011) (“We cannot compromise the integrity of the 
system of separated powers and the role of the Judiciary in that system, even with respect to challenges that 
may seem innocuous at first blush.”). 
 383 Jones, supra note 104, at 266. 
 384 See Eisenberg & Gecker, supra note 120, at 62. 
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seeking to avoid the chapter 11 protections to show that the remedy is not only 
necessary, but also in good faith and protects creditor rights. 
The mootness provisions and doctrines in bankruptcy highlight and protect 
bona fide purchasers. However, as integral to bankruptcy as these principles 
are, they cannot swallow the integrity of the system’s foundation: its process. 
The uproar after Chrysler and GM were examples of high-profile incidents, 
which could lead creditors to become more apprehensive about lending 
companies money.385 This Comment does not call for a guarantee to an appeal. 
Rather, it calls for a consistent application of equitable principles in the 
universe of mootness. Treating mootness consistently in chapter 11 
reorganizations and § 363 sales preserves the bankruptcy judge’s equitable 
powers without creating an expedited loophole that can compromise the 
protection of creditor’s rights. 
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APPENDIX A 
The below charts were made using data from the UCLA-LoPucki Bankruptcy 
Research Database. The data is somewhat limited, but should serve as an 
adequate indicator of general trends. The universe of data includes only 
debtors who had assets of $100 million or more, and filed an annual report (10-
K) with the Securities and Exchange Commission. 
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CHART 2 – 363 SALES IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
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APPENDIX B 
The below chart was compiled using data from West. The data consists of all 
§ 363 sales that came up in a search for trial court documents motioning for 
§ 363(b) sales. While the data compares the entire Ninth Circuit to district 
courts, and only represents a sample, it demonstrates there was no aberration in 
the general volume of sales in Ninth Circuit in comparison with other courts 
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